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Abstract
Three Essays on Switching Costs in Banking, the Lending Channel and Entry in the
Banking Industry
Yuan Yuan
Advisor: Maria Pia Olivero Ph.D.
My dissertation examines the magnitude of switching costs for bank-dependent borrow-
ers, their relationship to macro-financial variables and their impacts on the effect of monetary
policy. I also investigate the implication of bank entry and bank product differentiation on
social welfare.
The first essay explores the magnitude of bank-dependent borrowers’ switching costs arising
from informational asymmetries and their relationship to macro-financial variables. I esti-
mate the magnitude of borrowers’ switching costs in the banking sector across a large set
of countries. I find switching costs are significant in the banking sector for all 31 countries
under investigation and the magnitude of the costs for borrowers is systematically higher
in developing countries than in developed countries. My results also show the indicators of
informational asymmetries, such as bank penetration and market concentration in the bank-
ing sector, have strong impacts on switching costs. These costs are also likely to increase
during a debt crisis.
The second essay studies the relationship between switching costs for bank-dependent bor-
rowers and the effectiveness of monetary policy through the bank lending channel. I apply
the model of Kim, Kliger and Vale (2003) to provide structural estimates of switching costs
in the market for bank credit in the United States and show that these costs have an impor-
tant effect on the environment in which monetary policy is conducted, and that this effect
is independent from that of financial constraints of the banking industry itself. Specifically,
the higher switching costs, the larger the impact of monetary policy shocks on the real side
of the economy.
The third essay empirically quantifies the welfare implication of bank entry between 2000
and 2008. A distinctive feature of my framework is to predict the operating decision of
xsingle-market and multi-market banks using an equilibrium product type choice model. my
estimates suggest firms entering the wrong location in the product space to be the major
source of welfare loss. But product differentiation greatly improves social welfare in general.
Without differentiation, the loss in consumer surplus is 27%-28% in 2000 and 20%-38% in
2008, and the loss in bank profit is 48-59% between 2000 and 2008.

11. The Magnitude of Borrowers’ Switching Costs and Their Relationship to
Macro-Financial Variables
1.1 Introduction
In this paper, I study switching costs arising from informational asymmetries on the
borrowers’ ability to repay bank loans. In the lending market, a borrower may face non-
negligible switching costs when switching between banks. Switching costs arise through
asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. Borrowers often know their own
credit quality, repaying performance and risk better than lenders do. Thus, lenders need to
monitor borrowers’ activities by paying passable monitoring costs. All of those costs and
credit risks are priced into the loan rates. The costs decline over time as borrowers and
lenders know each other better through their repeated interactions. This declining informa-
tional asymmetries result in lower loan rates. If borrowers switch to other lenders, they have
to pay higher rates again because newer lenders do not know them as well as those lenders
who have interacted with them for some time. Switching among lenders then increases bor-
rowers’ costs.
Switching costs play an important role in the competition in the banking sector because
they weaken the substitutability of loans provided by different banks. In the lending mar-
ket, borrowers who initially borrow money from a bank tend to remain ”loyal” to that bank
to avoid being charged higher loan rates elsewhere. These lower borrowing costs differentiate
the loans provided by the original bank from those provided by other banks, making loans
ex-post heterogeneous goods. This ex-post heterogeneity property gives lenders a degree of
market power because they are able to take advantage of “information monopoly” to lock in
their borrowers by offering them lower loan rates than other lenders1. Hence, the existence
of switching costs enables banks to have a degree of market power over their borrowers in
the lending market, although the loans are considered as ex-ante homogeneous goods. This
1See Klemperer (1995) for summaries of theoretical literature on switching costs.
2market power affects the market structure in the banking sector since it softens competition
among lenders as loans are less substitutable. The strength of the market power depends
on the magnitude of switching costs. The higher switching costs are, the more difficult is
for borrowers to switch. Banks’ market power over their borrowers is then increasing in
switching costs, and the intensity of market competition is likely to decrease in those costs.
Therefore, knowing the magnitude of switching costs is important for understanding the
competition and market structure in the banking sector.
Because switching costs arise from informational asymmetries, the magnitude of the costs
is likely to be subject to the degree of informational asymmetries. The more informational
asymmetries there are between lenders and borrowers, the more costly it will be for lenders
to monitor their new borrowers and more difficult for new borrowers to signal their quality
to lenders. In order to reduce the market power of their competitors and compete for new
borrowers, banks in developed countries have made considerable efforts, such as establishing
scoring systems, developing effective monitoring methods and applying credit recording pro-
cesses, to reduce the informational asymmetries between them and new borrowers. In the
well-developed banking sector, borrowers’ risk and quality are likely to be more transparent
to and more accurately predicted by banks. Switching between banks in the well-developed
banking sector is likely to incur lower costs than that in the less-developed banking sector.
In addition, since informational asymmetries are the major source of switching costs, the
costs should be significantly increasing in the degree of the asymmetries, and a large portion
of the variation of the costs should be explained by the asymmetries. However, neither the
pattern of switching costs between well-developed and less-developed banking sectors, nor
the relationship between the magnitude of switching costs and the degree of informational
asymmetries have been directly investigated yet because measuring switching costs is diffi-
cult. The costs are unobservable to researchers and data on borrowers’ switching behavior
are difficult to find.
To overcome this difficulty, this paper takes a two-step approach to investigate the rela-
tionship between sizes of switching costs and informational asymmetry. The first step is to
3apply the structural I.O. model developed by Kim, Kliger and Vale (2003) (KKV hereafter)
to identify the magnitude of switching costs in 31 countries. The second step is to use a non-
parametric method to compare the magnitudes of switching costs between well-developed
and less-developed banking sectors as well as to use a parametric method to regress the
estimated switching costs on a set of macro-financial variables that serve as indicators of
informational asymmetries to examine whether the relationship exists. This paper aims at
contributing to the existing literature in three dimensions by: (1) estimating the magnitudes
of switching costs in the banking sector for a large set of countries; (2) examining whether
switching between banks in well-developed banking sector is systematically less costly than
in less-developed banking sector; (3) qualifying the impacts of the degree of informational
asymmetries, as measured by a few macro-financial variables, on the costs. My empirical
findings are consistent with the theoretical literature. Switching costs are systematically and
significantly higher in developed countries than in developing countries. About 75% of the
variations of switching costs can be explained by the measures of informational asymmetries
included in the model, and those costs are increasing in the magnitude of those measures2.
The paper is organized as follows: section 1.2 reviews the relevant literature on the theoret-
ical foundations of switching costs, the empirical findings related to switching costs in the
banking industry; section 1.3 briefly explains the model; section 1.4 discusses the identifica-
tion strategy; section 1.5 describes the data; section 1.6 provides discussion of the results;
and section 1.7 draws conclusions.
2The relationships between major macroeconomic variables and switching costs are also tested because
these costs may be indirectly affected by the macroeconomic environment. A few studies in the existing
literature suggest the market structure of the banking and financial sectors significantly affect macroeconomic
performance. For example, Smith (1998) and Guzman (2000) find that a competitive banking sector benefits
economic growth. King and Levine (1993a and 1993b) also find that an advanced financial system promotes
macroeconomic performance. Adams and Amel (2005) and Olivero, Li and Jeon (2010a and 2010b) find the
market structure of the banking sector affects the transmission of monetary policy. Olivero and Yuan (2010)
that find switching costs strengthen the effects of monetary policy. My results suggest that the market
structure of the banking sector have significant effects on switching costs. But the relationships between the
costs and major macroeconomic variables are not significant after the measures of informational asymmetries
are controlled for.
41.2 Literature Review
There are a large number of theoretical studies that explore the effects of consumers’
switching behavior on firms’ competition strategy and market outcome. Klemperer (1995)
summarizes those studies and concludes that, in general, switching costs for consumers exist
in many markets and the costs raise prices, weaken the competitiveness of those markets
and cause substantial deadweight losses. Farrell and Shapiro (1988) use a dynamic model
to study the effects of switching costs on firms’ competition strategy. Their findings suggest
that firms with larger market shares tend to compete less aggressively on attracting new
consumers. Beggs and Klemperer (1992) use a multi-period duopoly model to show that the
existence of switching costs raises both market price and firms’ profits. Sharpe (1990) derives
a dynamic model to explain the loyalty of borrowers to the banks from which they borrow
money. His theory suggests that banks make the best offers to their existing borrowers
because they know the quality of their existing borrowers better than their competitors do.
Borrowers are then “informationally captured” by their own banks, because they are unable
to signal their quality to new banks with low costs, and will thus be charged higher price if
they switch.
A few studies also suggest switching costs are substantial in the financial market. Ausubel
(1991) finds the interest rates charged on credit cards are very high and sticky regardless
of the change of the costs of funds. Since the credit card market contains 4,000 firms with
some regulations that prevent customers from switching between credit card providers, the
supernormal profits earned by credit card providers suggest the magnitude of switching
costs for credit card holders is high. Sharpe (1997) provides the first test for the effects
of switching costs on the pricing behavior of banks in the retail deposit market. He uses
monthly bank-level CD and Money Market Deposit Account (MMDA) rates in a few local
markets and household migration data and finds that the retail deposit rates paid by banks
increase in household migration. This positive relationship between retail deposit rates and
household in-migration is consistent with the model of Klemperer (1987). Klemperer (1987)
uses a two-period model which suggests that when switching costs exist, firms will charge a
5low price in the first period to lock in new consumers that are valuable in the future, and
increase the price in the second period. In a fast growing market where the proportion of
new customers is large, the prevalent price tends to be lower. Hannan et al. (2003) find that
in local markets with more household in-migration, banks are more likely to levy surcharges
on their automated teller machine service for consumers who do not have accounts with
them. This suggests that switching costs may be substantial in the deposit market so that
banks are more willing to attract new customers in the markets with high levels of in-
migration. Hannan (2008) uses IRS annual data on household migration to find deposit
rates are higher in local markets with a greater proportion of in-migration and are lower in
local markets with a greater proportion of out-migration. His findings support the results of
Sharpe (1997), suggesting a significant effect of switching costs on deposit rates. Waterson
(2003) compares switching behavior among a few industries. He uses survey data to find
that customers in the banking industry are much less likely to switch than those in many
other industries. Switching costs may be an important factor to explain the differences. Shy
(2002) uses an Undercut-Proof Equilibrium model to estimate switching costs for demand-
deposit account holders in Finland. His results suggest that switching costs could be as high
as 11% of the average balance of deposit accounts in Finland. Kim, Kliger and Vale (2003)
apply a novel model to Norwegian bank-level data to estimate the magnitude of switching
costs for borrowers. They find that on average the switching costs are about one-third of
the average lending rate3. Petersen and Rajan (1994) use small business survey data to
find out that a firm’s close ties with a bank can increase the availability of funds from the
bank. This suggests that switching costs for small borrowers may be severe. Hubbard,
Kuttner and Palia (2002) use contract-level loan data to find that small firms are not able
to costlessly switch between lenders. Switching is costly only for small borrowers who are
supposed to carry high informational asymmetries. Recently, Santos and Winton (2008) use
contract-level loan data to find that that during a recession, bank-dependent firms without
accessibility to the public debt market pay significantly higher loan rates than those firms
with the accessibility. This premium the bank-dependent firms have to pay implies banks
3Their paper is the only work that estimates switching costs for borrowers in the banking industry.
6take advantage of information monopoly when the credit risk in the lending market rises.
1.3 Methodology
1.3.1 Estimating Switching Costs
The method of estimating switching costs follows Kim, Kliger and Vale (2003) (KKV
hereafter). This is the only method available to estimate the magnitude of switching costs
based on highly aggregated bank-level data. The key insight of KKV is that the changes
in each bank’s market share imply customers switch from one bank to others. Based on
the evolution of banks’ market shares, I am then able to recover switching costs, without
knowing individual switching decisions which are usually difficult to observe. The other
attractive property of the KKV model is that it uses a dynamic setup and allows customers
to switch in any period.
The Model’s Framework
Consider in a country, n banks compete nationwide in a multiple-stage price (lending
interest rate). Following KKV, I assume borrowers have inelastic demand in order to focus
on borrowers’ decisions regarding choice of bank. Each borrower borrows a quantity of loans
in each of the infinite discrete periods. The borrowers maximize their utility by choosing a
bank from which she borrows money, and take the interest rates charged by all banks in the
market as given. Both banks and borrowers know that switching between banks is costly
and the magnitude of the costs is common knowledge to both banks and borrowers. The
borrower behavior introduced here generates probabilities of switching between banks. I
define these probabilities as transition probabilities and assume the transition probabilities
are functions of lending rates and switching costs. The demand for loans faced by each bank
is obtained by aggregating the transition probabilities over all customers.
7Demand
The borrowers’ borrowing decisions are modeled as the probabilities of borrowing from
different banks. In aggregation, the probability of borrowing from a specific bank can be
approximately expressed as the proportion of borrowers who decide to borrow from that
bank. Let Pri→i,t denote the probability that a borrower who borrowed from bank i in
period t − 1 continues to borrow from the same bank in the subsequent period. Similarly
Pri→j,t denotes the probability that a borrower who borrowed from bank j in the previous
period switches to borrow from bank i in period t. The transition probabilities therefore are
determined by the interest rates charged by bank i and bank i’s n − 1 rivals. I use pi,t to
denote the interest rate charged by bank i in period t. For simplicity, I also use an (n− 1)
vector PiR,t to denote the interest rates charged by bank i’s n− 1 rivals. The jth element
of PiR,t is the interest rate charged by bank j. The borrower will bear switching costs if she
switches to borrow from a bank she did not borrow from in the previous period. Switching
costs are denoted by s, which are assumed to be constant over time and over borrowers.
The probability of continuing to borrow from bank i is:
Pri→i,t = f{pi,t,piR,t + s} (1.1)
where s is an (n− 1) vector in which each of the element is equal to the switching costs s.
The probability of switching from bank j to i is formulated as:
Prj→i,t = f{pi,t + s,piR,t + sj} (1.2)
where sj is an (n−1) vector in which each of the elements is equal to s, except the jth element,
which is zero. Because individual decisions from which bank to borrow are unobserved, I
form the transition probabilities faced by bank i as a function unconditional on the identities
of bank i’s rivals. The transition probability that the borrower who borrowed from one of
8bank i’s rivals in the previous period switches to borrow from bank i in current period is:
PriR→i,t =
∑
j 6=i
f{pi,t + s,piR,t + sj} ∗ lj,t−1∑
k 6=i lk,t−1
(1.3)
where PriR→i,t is the probability that the borrower who borrowed from bank i’s rivals will
switch to borrow from bank i. lj,t−1 denotes bank j’s total loans in period t − 1. The
term
lj,t−1∑
k 6=i lk,t−1
denotes the probability that a rival’s borrower borrows from bank j in the
previous period. The total demand faced by bank i in current period t is:
li,t = li,t−1Pri→i,t + liR,t−1PriR→i,t. (1.4)
The first term on the RHS of equation (1.4) gives the number of bank i’s borrowers who
continue to borrow from bank i. The second term on the RHS of equation (1.4) gives the
number of the rivals’ borrowers who switch to borrow from bank i.
I allow borrowers to change the size of loans they borrow over time. These changes are
reflected by the market growth rate gt =
∑
li,t/
∑
li,t−1. With the growth rate, the demand
equation (1.4) becomes:
li,t = (li,t−1Pri→i,t + liR,t−1PriR→i,t)gt. (1.5)
The market growth rate is assumed to be exogenous.
I assume the transition probabilities follow a linear first-order Markovian process. The
transition probabilities functions then take the form of:
Pri→i,t = αi0 + α1pi,t + α2(p¯iR,t + s) (1.6)
and
PriR→i,t = αi0 + α1(pi,t + s) + α2(p¯iR,t +
n− 2
n− 1s) (1.7)
9where p¯iR,t is the average lending rate charged by rivals and α
i
0, α1 and α2 are coefficients.
αi0 represents the bank-specific heterogeneities.
Because the probabilities that the borrower borrows from bank i should be decreasing in
the interest rate charged by bank i relative to bank i’s rivals’, the two coefficients, α1 and
α2, should have the following signs:
α1 =
∂Pri→i,t
∂pi,t
=
∂PriR→i,t
∂pi,t
< 0; α2 =
∂Pri→i,t
∂p¯i,t
=
∂PriR→i,t
∂p¯i,t
> 0. (1.8)
Given the inelastic total demand, the effects of a small increase in pi,t on the transition
probabilities are equal to those of a decrease of the same magnitude in rivals’ average interest
rate, p¯i,t. This implies α2 = −α1. Therefore, the transition probabilities function can be
rewritten as:
Pri→i,t = αi0 + α1(pi,t − p¯iR,t − s) (1.9)
and
PriR→i,t = αi0 + α1(pi,t − p¯iR,t +
1
n− 1s). (1.10)
Plugging (1.9) and (1.10) into (1.5) and dividing both sides of the equation by the total
market demand, I then have the market share transition probabilities function:
σi,t = −σi,t−1 n
n− 1sα1 + α
i
0 + α1(pi,t − p¯iR,t +
s
n− 1) (1.11)
where σi,t denotes the market share of bank i in period t. The lock-in effect is captured by
∂σi,t
∂σi,t−1
= − n
n− 1sα1 > 0. (1.12)
It is the marginal contribution of bank i’s market share in the previous period on her current
market share. The positive sign of (1.12) indicates the more borrowers the bank locked-in
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during the previous period, the more borrowers she has in current period. Also, because
∂σi,t/∂σi,t−1
∂s
= − n
n− 1α1 > 0, (1.13)
the lock-in effect is increasing in the magnitude of switching costs. The total effect of
switching costs is termed as:
∂σi,t
∂s
= (
1
n
− σi,t−1) n
n− 1α1
< 0 if σi,t−1 < 1/n
> 0 if σi,t−1 > 1/n
(1.14)
which is the effect of switching costs on current market share. This effect favors larger-than-
average banks relative to smaller-than-average banks.
Suppy
On the supply side, bank i maximizes the present value of her lifetime profits in every
period τ :
Vi,t =
inf∑
t=τ
δt−τpii,t (1.15)
where δ and pi denote one-period discount factor and one-period profit, respectively. The
profit is:
pii,t = yi,t ∗ pi,t − ci,t
where ci,t is the total costs of loans. The optimal interest rate charged by bank i at period
τ is given by the first order condition:
∂Vi,t
∂pi,τ
=
∞∑
t=τ
δt−τ
∂pii,t
∂pi,τ
= 0.
As shown in KKV (2003) and given the demand transition probabilities (1.1), the above
optimal interest rate strategy can be expressed as:
pcmi = −δ ∗ σi,t+1 n
n− 1sgt+1 −
σi,t
α1
(1.16)
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where pmci,t = pi,t −mci,t is the price-cost margin. Equation (1.16) captures both “invest-
ing” and “harvesting” effects. When switching costs exist, the bank charges a lower interest
rate than indicated by the pure oligopoly power (−δ∗σi,t+1 nn−1sgt+1 < 0 then pcmi < −σi,tα1 )
as “investments” to lock in borrowers. Therefore the market share σi,t is larger than it would
be without the “investments.” −δ ∗ σi,t+1 nn−1sgt+1 captures the “investing effect” and the
oligopoly term −σi,tα1 captures the “harvesting” effect.
1.4 Identification Strategy
1.4.1 Switching Costs
The KKV model provides two equations (1.11) and (1.16) for estimation. In order to
make the estimation possible, equation (1.11) is first-order differenced to eliminate the bank
specific intercept. This yields a two-equation system with two unknowns:
pcmi,t = −δ ∗ σi,t+1 n
n− 1sgt+1 −
σi,t
α1
+ ωit (1.17)
and
∆σi,t+1 = −∆σi,t n
n− 1sα1 + α1(∆pi,t+1 −∆p¯−i,t+1) + ζit+1 (1.18)
where ∆ denotes first-order difference.
In the supply side equation, ωi,t is assumed to be an unobservable shock to the price-cost
margin and assumed to be exogenous to multiple lags of the volume of loans, the volume of
other earning assets, and their market shares:
E[ωit(s, α1)|∆z] = 0.
In the demand transition probabilities, ζit+1 is assumed to be an unobservable shock to
demand and assumed to be exogenous to multiple lags of the volume of loans, the volume
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of other earning assets, and their market shares:
E[ζit+1(s, α1)|∆z] = 0.
I form the vector of sample moment conditions, as a function of parameters, as:
g(s, α1) =
1
N
∑
it
ωit+1(s, α1)∆zd
ζit+1(s, α1)∆z
c

where N is the total number of observations in the sample (subsample). The GMM estima-
tors are:
(sˆ, αˆ1)GMM = arg min
s,α1
g(s, α1)
′Wg(s, α1)
where W is a weighting matrix.
I apply the GMM estimation on bank-level panel data of 32 countries and obtain a set of
recovered switching costs with cross-sectional variation. The set of the estimates is denoted
as S = (sˆ1, sˆ2, · · · , sˆi), where i indexes countries.
In practice, because the GMM estimates are sensitive to the selection of instruments and
the accuracy of the estimates plays an important role in understanding the relationship
between switching costs and macro-financial variables, I apply an exhaustive method on the
estimation. That is, I use all possible combinations of instruments to estimate switching
costs. For each country, I can have 2m − (m + 1) estimates, where m is the number of
instruments4. Among those 2m − (m+ 1) estimates, I delete those that take the transition
probabilities beyond the interval [0,1]5. I take the average of the rest of the estimates as the
measurements for switching costs in each country.
4For m instruments, there are 2m− 1 combinations. Since I need at least two instruments to identify the
GMM system, the m combinations that include only one single instrument are excluded.
5For the transition probabilities to be valid, the inequality −1 ≤ sα1 nn−1 ≤ 1 should hold for all periods.
The sufficient condition for the validity of the inequality is −1 ≤ sα1 nminnmin−1 ≤ 1.
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1.4.2 Switching Costs Regression
In the second step, I at first use non-parametric Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test
to examine if the magnitude of switching costs in developed countries is systematically
different from that in developing countries. Second, I use the estimated switching costs
as the dependent variable regressed on a set of macro-financial variables that measure the
degree of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders to explore whether the
measures have explanatory power for switching costs. Formally, I have
sˆi = c+ Xiβ + Kiγ + Giλ (1.19)
where Xi is a set of characteristics of the banking sector, Ki is a set of measurements of the
importance of financial industry in the economy, and Gi is a set of macroeconomic variables.
In the set of banking sector’s characteristics, I include the following candidate variables: the
market concentration measurement defined as the market shares of the top three banks in
the industry; the volatility of industry-wide total assets, which measures the stability of the
operation of the banking industry; and the volatility and the mean of shares of total assets
involved in merger and acquisition, which are indicators of stability of the market structure6.
The market concentration is expected to increase switching costs through both information
asymmetries and borrowers’ choice set. In one hand, borrowers and banks are likely to have
stronger relationship in a concentrated market. It suggests the information asymmetries
between banks and their existing borrowers are low but the asymmetries between banks
and new borrowers are high. This larger gap between asymmetries over existing and new
borrowers gives banks stronger “information monopoly” over their existing borrowers and
increase banks’ market power arising from information asymmetries. With higher market
power, banks tend to focus more on “harvesting effect” relative to “investing effect” by
charging higher loan rate, making borrowers’ switching to new banks more costly. In the
other hand, in a concentrated market, borrowers have a smaller choice set when they switch,
which increases costs and difficulty of switching. The stability of the banking sector is ex-
6I define a bank as being involved in merger/acquisition if its total assets increase by 50% over a year.
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pected to affect switching costs from two opposite directions. At first, the more stable is the
banking sector, the longer is the relationship between banks and their existing borrowers
and the larger is the gap between banks knowledge on their existing and new borrowers. As
discussed above, the larger gap increases switching costs. Also, borrowers with higher risk
are more likely to switch when the market structure changes because banks often restructure
more risky assets when they adjust their business strategies to accommodate the change of
market structure. This reschedule of risky assets is likely to force risky borrowers to switch.
Hence, in an unstable banking market, the pool of new borrowers is expected to carry higher
risk than in a stable market. In order to compensate for the high risk, banks will charge
new borrowers higher loan rate. The instability then increases switching costs. Second, in
a stable market, banks are able to plan for long-term business and profits and pay more
attention on “investing effect”. This business focus results in banks’ offering lower loan rate
to new borrowers, lowering borrowers’ switching costs.
In Ki, the set of measurements of the importance of financial industry in the economy,
the candidate variables are domestic credit provided by the banking sector to measure the
penetration of the banking sector into the economy and domestic credit provided to the
private sector to measure the financial deepening. I also include the ratio of these two vari-
ables. The financial deepening not only indicates the importance of the financial system to
the economy, but also serves as an indicator of information asymmetries between borrowers
and lenders. As the financial system is involved more into economic activities, a representa-
tive lender should have more knowledge on a representative borrower’s performance and risk.
This knowledge accumulated through lending interactions will reduce the costs of borrowers’
switching. The similar expectation applies to bank penetration. The asymmetries decline
as banks penetrate more into the economy to gain more knowledge about their borrowers’
quality and risk.
In the set of macroeconomic variable, Gi, I include debt and currency crisis indicators. In
times of crisis, the informational asymmetries will increase. As expected risk of each bor-
rower increases due to the crisis, the expected quality of the pool of borrowers decreases.
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Banks will charge new borrowers higher loan rate to compensate for the increase in the risk
and for the decrease in the quality. Borrowers will find it difficult and costly to switch. In
order to address the concern that macroeconomic variables may be indirectly correlated to
switching costs through their correlation with the market structure of the banking. I include
the following macroeconomic variables in this set: real GDP per capita, which measures the
level of economic development; average real GDP growth rate, which measures the potential
demand for bank credits; the volatility of real GDP, which measures the stability of the
economy; the average Treasury bill rate, which approximates the opportunity costs of bank
credits; inflation and the volatility of the price level defined by the standard deviation of
CPI; and the average openness of the economy defined by the volume of trade divided by
GDP, which measures the strength of the link between the economy and the world.
1.5 Data
The bank-level data are collected from Bankscope, the most comprehensive dataset for
the international banking industry. I only include commercial banks in my sample because
the data coverage for other types of banks, such as local saving banks, is limited. In addition,
Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) find banks of different types compete differently, which indicates
switching costs for commercial banks’ borrowers tend to be different from those for other
types of banks’ borrowers. I assume banks compete nationwide. The data are annual
and cover 32 OECD and developing countries. To eliminate the possibility of bias caused
by inflation, I deflate variables into 2000 local currency using CPI data collected from
International Financial Statistics. I collected macroeconomic and financial variables from
International Financial Statistics, Penn World Tables, Word Development Indicators and
Global Development Finance. I explain the Bankscope data cleaning rules in Appendix A.1
and the construction of the dummy variables in Appendix A.2.
The summary of the variables used for estimating switching costs is presented in Tables E.1
and E.2. Several facts are worth noting: The number of banks in each year is less than
100, indicating the banking industry tends to be oligopolistic; the maximum market shares
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range from 18.98% in Japan to 64.32% in Austria, indicating the existence of mega-banks;
the net interest margin can be negative, showing that during some periods, banks may
set the lending rate even lower than the marginal costs to “lock-in” new borrowers due to
the significant “investing effect.” The summary statistics of macroeconomic and financial
variables are reported in Table E.3.
1.6 Empirical Results
1.6.1 The Magnitude of Switching Costs
I use the second, third, and fourth lags of loans and other earning assets and their
market shares as instruments to solve the endogeneity problem. The estimation also requires
one lag and one lead observations, therefore the actual time window in the estimation is
from 2000 to 2003, given our total sample is between 1996 to 2004. Table E.4 shows the
estimated switching costs across the 31 countries.7 The first column of Table E.4 reports
the number of valid estimates out of 4,083. The second column shows the average of all
valid estimated switching costs. At first, compared with the KKV (2003) results for the
Norwegian banking industry, my results are similar. For a few developing countries, the
average estimated switching costs are high. However, this is not very surprising since the
KKV model actually prices all switching barriers into switching costs. The model attributes
all frictions against borrowers’ switching into switching costs. For example, searching costs
and psychological factors are not identified separately in the model and are included in
switching costs. Meanwhile, the lending rates exhibit a wide dispersion in each country,
which gives some hints regarding the large magnitude of switching costs. A bank’s incentive
to charge an interest rate much higher than its rivals comes from the existence of a high
barrier to switching. In the model, this switching barrier is priced into switching costs.8
In addition, the estimated switching costs based on the model are not only the ”direct
7For Spain, I cannot obtain valid switching costs. In this case, KKV (2003) provides an alternative indirect
nonlinear method by assuming switching costs follow a logistic distribution to ensure that all estimates are
valid. In my study, however, this nonlinear transformation results in a significant convergence issue.
8The model also tends to underestimate switching costs because it assumes all the changes of market
shares are driven by switching behavior. This assumption overestimates the number of switchers and there-
fore underestimates switching costs.
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pecuniary” effect. As Kim, Kliger and Vale (2003) discuss, they also reflect psychological
factors affecting switching behavior. More important, they capture the ”economic costs
associated with capitalized value of a long-term customer bank relationship.” Because of the
occurrence of currency crises, banking crises, and financial crises during the sample period
in South America and Asia, banks in those markets are in favor of existing customers and
disinclined to lend to new customers during bad times. Because in bad times, the ”lemons”
problem is more severe and banks will charge a much higher risk premium on new borrowers
or even reject lending to new customers as credit rationing. Thus, those crises considerably
increase the magnitude of estimated switching costs. Meanwhile, the longer maturity of
loans will also drive up the magnitude of the estimates. For example, the length of a house
mortgage is often more than 10 years. So within three years those mortgage borrowers
switch very little, which results in very large switching costs indicated by the model.
1.6.2 Pattern of Switching Costs
The last row of Table E.4 shows the results of one-way ANOVA analysis of average
estimated switching costs between developing and developed countries. The results sug-
gest switching costs in developing countries are significantly higher than those in developed
countries. That is not surprising given that the developed countries have a more developed
capital market and a more advanced financial system than developing countries. In well-
developed financial markets, lenders can monitor borrowers more efficiently and accurately,
while borrowers can signal their quality better. Hence, the asymmetric information issue is
less severe in developed markets. As a result, lenders have a lower ”information monopoly”
on their existing borrowers against other lenders in the market. The barrier against borrow-
ers’ switching among lenders is, therefore, expected to be lower. In addition, in developed
markets, borrowers also find it easier to access the capital market and therefore are less
dependent on bank loans. For developing countries, more financial market frictions and less
accessibility to the capital markets for borrowers strengthen lenders’ market power. Banks’
high market power in the credit market and firms’ significant dependence on bank loans are
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likely to increase the costs of borrowers’ switching among banks. Also, in emerging markets,
many giant state-owned firms, which are large borrowers in their industries, hardly switch
in the periods given in our sample because of possible additional restrictions.
I also use the maximum valid estimates as a robustness check. The maximum switching
costs among all valid estimates are listed in the third column of Table E.4, the results of the
ANOVA test for this column are reported in the last row of column 3. The maximum valid
switching costs share the same pattern with the average, supporting the conclusion that
developing countries have higher switching costs for borrowers than developed countries.
1.6.3 Switching Costs Regression
For the second step regression I only have observations for 31 countries. This small sample
size prevents me from including many regressors simultaneously. With this limitation, in
the benchmark model I include only two variables at maximum from each set. For each set
I focus on exploring the explanatory power of variables having direct impacts on switching
costs for bank-dependent borrowers. Finally, I include market concentration measurements
from the set of banking industry sector. As discuss in previous section, I expect switching
costs to increase in market concentration of the banking sector due to both asymmetric
information and choice set effects. Market concentration raises the gap between banks’
knowledge of new borrowers and that of existing borrowers. This gap increases the costs
for switching. Market concentration also reduces the choice set of borrowers. The more the
market is dominated by large banks, the less chance borrowers have to switch between banks
because borrowers face fewer choices when they look for funds. I use the market shares of
the top 3 banks (CR3) as a measure of market concentration instead of HHI because the
information on bank balance sheet is more accurate for large banks than small banks in
our data, making CR3 a more reliable indicator of market concentration than HHI.9 The
quadratic term of this variable is also included in order to control possible nonlinear effects.
The stability of the banking sector is not included in the benchmark model but in extended
9This concern is also reflected from the correlation coefficient between CR3 and HHI. The coefficient is
-0.24, which significantly conflicts with the fact that CR3 and HHI are highly positively correlated in most
industries. I also used CR5, the results are similar as those of CR3.
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model. Because the stability has two opposite effects on switching costs and may result in
insignificant coefficients.
From the set of the measurements of the importance of financial industry to the economy,
both financial deepening and bank penetration serve as important indicators of informational
asymmetries between lenders and borrowers as discussed in the previous section. Due to
the collinearity between these two variables, I include only one variable in one benchmark
model and use the other for robustness check. The other variable I include from this set
is the degree of bank penetration relative to financial deepening, measured by the ratio of
domestic credit provided by the banking sector over domestic credit to the private sector.
This variable particularly captures the importance of the banking sector to the economy
compared to that of the entire financial systems. With the similar intuitions, the variable is
expected to decrease switching costs. The variable included from the set of macroeconomic
conditions is the crisis indicator. I expect during a crisis, the ”lemons” problem is more
severe and the quality of the pool of new borrowers decreases significantly. Banks would
then tend to charge higher interest rates to new borrowers to compensate for expected higher
default risk. Borrowers will find switching between banks is more costly during a crisis. I
use two types of crisis as candidate variables: debt crisis and currency crisis as defined in
Appendix A.2. Variables in each set other than those included in the benchmark model are
tested in extended models to explore the potential effects of those variables on the magnitude
of switching costs.
The first column of Table E.5 shows the results of my benchmark model. Four variables
expected to have large impacts on switching costs can explain approximately 75% of the
variation of the costs. Bank penetration, the degree of bank penetration relative to financial
deepening, and market concentration in the banking industry are significant at the 1% level
with expected signs. The debt dummy is significant at the 10% level but it has strong
marginal effects. During a debt crisis, switching costs can increase by approximately 7%
of loans. Because the debt effect is marginally significant, I exclude it and re-estimate
the model. The results are reported in the second column of Table E.5. The results of
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the model without the debt crisis are very similar to those of the benchmark model. The
comparison between the model without the debt crisis and the benchmark model shows that
the debt crisis has an independent effect on the magnitude of switching costs and explains
approximately 3% of the variation of the costs, although it is only marginally significant.
Again, this provides evidence that during crisis periods, the informational asymmetries rise.
The average quality of the pool of borrowers considerably decreases and borrowers who
want to switch to a new bank will have to pay considerably higher premiums to signal their
quality. Banks will also charge higher interest rates to new borrowers to compensate for
expected higher default risk. The coefficients of market concentration, bank penetration,
and the degree of bank penetration relative to financial deepening are consistent with our
intuition. Switching costs increase by approximately 1.27% if the market shares of the top
three banks increase by 1% from the sample mean. This marginal effect is decreasing as the
market becomes more concentrated, as reflected by the negative coefficient of the quadratic
term of CR3. One percent increase in financial deepening from the sample average decreases
switching costs by approximately 0.74% and the marginal effect is decreasing as the financial
system becomes more important in the economy. The degree of bank penetration relative to
financial deepening has much stronger negative impacts on switching costs. This suggests
switching costs are much more significant for borrowers in the private sector as bank loans
are the major sources of funds for those borrowers. To address the concern that the effect
of bank penetration relative to financial deepening on switching costs is dominated by bank
penetration only, I replace bank penetration with financial deepening and re-estimate the
model. If the concern is true, in the new estimation at least one variable between bank
penetration and the degree of bank penetration relative to financial deepening should be
insignificant. The results of the new estimation are reported in columns 3 and 4. The two
variables of the concern are still significant at the 1% level, which suggests the degree of bank
penetration relative to financial deepening has an independent effect on switching costs from
either bank penetration or financial deepening. The bank penetration also has an expected
sign and has a similar effect on switching costs as financial deepening. These results suggest
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switching costs are strongly subject to the importance of the financial industry, especially
of the banking industry in the economy.
I also extend the benchmark model to include other variables from each set, such as the
measures of the stability of the banking sector and other macroeconomic variables. Due to
the concern regarding the degree of freedom, I only include one more variable each time.
The results are reported in Tables E.6 and E.7. The results show that after controlling the
variables that are supposed to have the strongest impact in each set on switching costs,
other variables seem not to have significant effects on switching costs.
1.7 Conclusions
In this paper, I estimate switching costs for bank-dependent borrowers arising from in-
formational asymmetries for 31 countries, investigate the pattern of the costs over developed
and developing countries, and explore the relationship between the costs and macro-financial
variables that measure informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. I apply
the KKV (2003) I.O. model to estimate switching costs for borrowers in 31 countries using
bank-level data, use a non-parametric ANOVA test to assess the systematical difference of
the switching costs between developed and developing countries, and use a linear regression
model to investigate the relationship between switching costs and the measures of informa-
tional asymmetries. My findings are three-fold: first, switching costs are significant in the
banking sector for all countries in the sample; second, the magnitude of switching costs for
borrowers in developing countries is systematically higher than developed countries; last,
the indicators of informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, such as bank
penetration and market concentration in the banking sector, have strong impacts on the
magnitude of switching costs. More specifically, market concentration in the banking indus-
try, financial deepening or bank penetration, and debt crises explain about three quarters of
the variation of the magnitude of switching costs. Each of those variables has independent
explanatory power. Switching costs are increasing in banking market concentration and de-
creasing in financial deepening or bank penetration, with both having decreasing marginal
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effects. Also, switching costs are likely to increase during times of debt crisis. I do not find
evidence that variables such as real GDP per capita, real GDP growth rate, openness and
Treasury bill rate among a few others affect switching costs.
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2. Switching Costs for Bank-Dependent Borrowers and the Bank Lending
Channel of Monetary Policy
2.1 Introduction
In this paper we study the relationship between switching costs for bank-dependent bor-
rowers and the effectiveness of monetary policy. We focus on the bank lending channel,
according to which the banking sector is specially relevant to the transmission mechanism
of monetary shocks.The switching costs that we study are those arising from informational
asymmetries between borrowers and lenders on the former’s creditworthiness, that allow
incumbent banks to accumulate information over time, and to eventually earn an informa-
tional monopoly over their customers. This creates a “lock-in” effect that makes it costly
for firms to switch lenders1.
The gist of the bank lending channel is that after a monetary policy contraction banks are
forced to cut back their loan supply, which negatively impacts employment, investment and
production (see Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993), Bernanke
and Gertler (1995), and Kashyap and Stein (1994, 1995 and 2000), among others). This
channel of monetary policy transmission works on the supply-side of the market for loans,
and amplifies the traditional demand-side interest rate channel2.
Two conditions are necessary for this channel to be operative. First, after a monetary tight-
1A recent body of empirical work documents the importance of switching costs for borrowers. Hubbard,
Kuttner and Palia (2002), Shy (2002), Kim, Kliger and Vale (2003) empirically document the importance of
switching costs in the banking industry. Santos and Winton (2008) use micro loan data and find that bank-
dependent firms without accessibility to public debt markets pay significantly higher loan rates, implying
that banks take advantage of their information monopoly. Last, Hale and Santos (2008) show that firms
are able to borrow from banks at lower interest rates after they issue for the first time in the public bond
market, and they interpret this finding as evidence that banks do indeed price their informational monopoly.
2It has been shown empirically that monetary policy has a considerably larger impact on the economy
than what it would have through only the interest rate mechanism (see Bernanke and Gertler (1995)).
Thus, the effects of monetary policy cannot be fully explained by the traditional interest rate channel, which
suggests that there is room for additional transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. A large body of
literature uses cross-sectional bank-level data and establishes that the bank lending channel is at work (see
Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993), Kashyap and Stein (1995 and 2000),
Stein (1998), Favero, Giavazzi and Flabbi (1999), Kishan and Opiela (2000) and Alfaro et al (2003), among
others).
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ening banks must lack the ability to costlessly resort to non-deposit funding to offset the
reduction in reserves and access to loanable funds induced by this policy, and they must
therefore be forced to reduce their credit supply3. Second, bank-dependent firms cannot
costlessly switch to alternative sources of finance as the cost of bank credit rises.
This second condition unveils the importance of studying the relationship between borrowers
costs of switching banks and the effectiveness of monetary policy through the bank lending
channel. Based on this condition, whether monetary policy has significant effects on eco-
nomic activity depends on the magnitude of these switching costs.
Back in the late 1990’s Stein (1998) concluded his work by pointing to the lack of knowledge
on how switching costs impact monetary policy as an important limitation of the literature
at the time. Stein (1998) argues: “But even if it can be concluded that banks cut their
loans sharply as a result of the mechanism modeled above (...a monetary tightening), one
still needs to know how readily their customers can switch to nonbank forms of finance.
Absent a measure of this elasticity of substitution, the micro data on banks cannot speak to
the ultimate investment or output consequences of monetary policy. Clearly, this remains a
challenging topic for future work”. Unfortunately, ten years later the literature still presents
this limitation and, to our knowledge, there is no empirical work that assesses this impact4.
One main reason for this gap in the literature is that switching costs are unobservable, and
even data on borrowers switching behavior are hard to find. Thus, switching costs need to
be estimated by the researcher.
Our goal in this paper is to start addressing this limitation of existing work, by studying
the relationship between switching costs and the effectiveness of monetary policy. As a
3Based on this first condition, the effectiveness of the bank lending channel is also a function of the
institutional characteristics and in particular, of the financial strength of the banking industry. The intuition
is that lending by smaller, less liquid and/or less capitalized banks is more sensitive to a reduction in
reserves than that of their larger, stronger counterparts. We explore this dependence on individual bank
characteristics in Section 3.
4van den Heuvel (2007) argues that in the absence of switching costs and with any financially uncon-
strained banks, idiosyncratic fluctuations in lending by those banks negatively impacted by monetary policy
would be completely ”picked up” by other unconstrained/healthier banks. Thus, monetary policy would
cease to have effects in the absence of switching costs. He also argues that when switching costs exist, part
of the idiosyncratic fluctuations in bank lending will result in changes in aggregate credit and aggregate
real effects on the economy. Furthermore, the share of fluctuations that translates into changes in aggregate
credit should be increasing in the magnitude of the switching costs.
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by-product, we contribute to the literature by providing estimates of switching costs in the
market for bank credit in the United States. We proceed in two steps. First, we structurally
estimate the model of Kim, Kliger and Vale (2003), and obtain estimates of switching costs
for bank-dependent borrowers in the U.S.. We do so using bank-level balance sheet and
income statement data for large commercial banks in the U.S. from the Call Reports on
Condition and Income. Second, we use these estimates to study the impact of switching
costs on the real effects of monetary policy through the bank lending channel. Here we
exploit the bank-level nature of these data to identify the supply-side effects of monetary
policy, to isolate the effect of switching costs from that of other banks’ characteristics that
proxy for their financial constraints, and to assess the robustness of our results across het-
erogeneous banks.
The intuition behind the hypothesis that switching costs can have an impact on the ef-
fectiveness of monetary policy through the bank lending channel is the following: After a
monetary policy tightening, small banks (who are typically more severely affected by the
tightening) shrink their loan supply. If borrowers cannot costlessly switch among lenders,
the excess demand left by these small banks cannot be picked up by larger banks (who can
better protect their loan supply). Therefore, our hypothesis is that at the aggregate level,
the response of the total supply of credit to a change in monetary conditions should be
increasing in the magnitude of these switching costs.
Our paper is related to the empirical literature that studies the implications of market struc-
ture in banking for the transmission of monetary shocks. Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) show
for a cross-section of countries that the structure of financial markets affects the degree of
adjustment of lending rates to money market rates, especially in the short run. Adams
and Amel (2005) provide evidence that increased market concentration in banking tends to
weaken the effects of monetary policy through the bank lending channel. Olivero, Li and
Jeon (2010a and 2010b) use bank-level data for a wide sample of Asian and Latin American
countries and show that consolidation in banking lowers the sensitivity of bank lending to
monetary shocks. Our paper is also related to the theoretical work in this field. Peltzman
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(1969) develops a model to test the effect of banking market structure on monetary pol-
icy transmission. He suggests that markets dominated by small banks respond faster to
monetary policy than those dominated by large banks due to the difference in information
costs between large and small banks. Vanhoose (1985) investigates the impact of financial
market structure on a central bank’s ability to control monetary aggregates. Under the as-
sumption of Cournot competition among financial institutions, market structure may affect
a central bank’s ability to control monetary aggregates and its choice of policy instrument.
Blei (2004) develops a model to show that credit market structure affects the intensity of
monetary policy transmission. Ghossoub, Laosuthi and Reed (2006) develop a general equi-
librium model to show that with a less competitive banking system monetary policy can
affect credit market activities more significantly.
Our results show that the presence of switching costs for borrowers has an important effect
on the environment in which monetary policy is conducted: It strengthens the bank lend-
ing channel of monetary transmission. Furthermore, this effect is independent from that of
financial constraints of the banking industry itself, as measured by banks’ size and degree
of liquidity and capitalization in their balance sheets.
Interesting policy implications arise from our results. Specifically, when the supply of bank
loans shrinks after a monetary tightening, smaller firms with less access to other forms of
funding (i.e. those firms typically subject to higher switching costs) bear most of the costs
of monetary policy. Therefore, when working through the bank lending channel, monetary
policy exerts asymmetric effects on borrowers of heterogeneous size. Given that small firms
contribute to more than 50% of total jobs in the private sector in the U.S., this asymmetric
distribution of costs is important from a policy perspective. Therefore, if switching costs do
indeed amplify the impact of the bank lending channel, then monetary tightenings could be
mixed with prudential regulation efforts aimed at lowering switching costs to compensate
small borrowers for their asymmetric bearing of the costs of policy.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2 we present the structural estimation of switch-
ing costs. In Section 2.3 we present the methodology used to study the relationship between
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these costs and the bank lending channel and the estimation results. In Section 2.4 we
conclude.
2.2 Switching Costs Estimation
In this section we estimate switching costs following Kim, Kliger and Vale (2003) (here-
after KKV), the only method available to estimate these costs based on bank-level data even
with switching decisions not being observable. The key assumption in KKV is that changes
in a firm’s market share imply costumer switching. Based on this assumption switching
costs can be recovered using the evolution of firms market shares arising from the endoge-
nous behavior of banks and borrowers in the model.
In what follows we only present the main features of the model and the equations we es-
timate. We refer the reader to KKV for more details and complete derivations of their
model.
2.2.1 The Model
Consider an economy where in every period t, n banks compete nation-wide in the interest
rate they charge on loans. Given the interest rates charged by the banks, each borrower
optimally chooses which bank to borrow a fixed amount from. Both banks and borrowers
know switching between banks is costly and the switching costs are known to both of them.
This customer behavior yields probabilities of switching between banks, which are labeled
transition probabilities. Therefore, the demand for loans faced by each bank is determined
by the aggregation of these transition probabilities.
Demand
In what follows let pi,t denote the interest rate charged by bank i in period t, and let a
(n− 1) vector piR,t denote the interest rates charged by bank i’s rivals. The jth element of
piR,t is the interest rate charged by bank j. The borrower will bear switching costs if she
switches to borrow from a bank from which she did not borrow in the last period. These
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switching costs are constant over time and across borrowers, and denoted by s.
The probability of borrowing from a specific bank can be approximated by the proportion of
borrowers who borrow from that bank. Thus, let Pri→i,t denote the transition probability
that a firm that borrowed from bank i in period t − 1 continues to borrow from the same
bank in the subsequent period. This probability is determined by the interest rates charged
by bank i and by her n− 1 rivals, and given by:
Pri→i,t = f{pi,t,piR,t + s} (2.1)
where s is an (n− 1) vector in which each element equals the switching costs s.
Similarly, Prj→i,t denotes the probability that a borrower who borrowed from bank j in the
previous period switches to borrow from bank i in period t. It is given by:
Prj→i,t = f{pi,t + s,piR,t + sj} (2.2)
where sj is an (n− 1) vector in which each element equals s, except the jth element, which
is zero. Since the individual switching behavior is unobserved, the transition probability
function needs to be defined as unconditional on the identities of bank i’s rivals.
Following the derivations in KKV(2003), it can be shown that bank i’s market share follows
the law of motion given by:
σi,t = −σi,t−1 n
n− 1sα1 + α
i
0 + α1(pi,t − p¯iR,t +
s
n− 1) (2.3)
where σi,t denotes the market share of bank i in period t and α1 =
∂Pri→i,t
∂pi,t
=
∂PriR→i,t
∂pi,t
< 0,
since the probability of the borrower borrowing from bank i should be decreasing in the
interest rate charged by bank i. Also, αi0 are bank-specific intercepts which capture bank
heterogeneity, and p¯iR is the average interest rate charged by rival banks.
The borrower “lock-in” effect created by the presence of switching costs is captured by the
persistence in bank i’s market share, i.e. by the fact that the derivative in equation 2.4 has
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a positive sign.
∂σi,t
∂σi,t−1
= − n
n− 1sα1 > 0. (2.4)
Also notice that the “lock-in” effect is increasing in the magnitude of switching costs.
The total switching-cost effect is termed as:
∂σi,t
∂s
= (
1
n
− σi,t−1) n
n− 1α1
< 0 if σi,t−1 < 1/n
> 0 if σi,t−1 > 1/n
(2.5)
which is the effect of switching costs on current market shares. Equation 2.5 indicates that
an increase in s lowers the market share for smaller than average banks, and raises it for
larger than average banks.
Supply
In the supply side, in every period t bank i chooses the interest rate on loans pi to
maximize the present value of her lifetime profits.
From the bank’s optimal interest rate strategy and the demand transition probabilities,
KKV obtain an expression for the price-cost margin charged by bank i, pcmi = (pi − ci),
where ci is the per-unit cost of loans. Thus:
pcmi = −δ ∗ σi,t+1 n
n− 1sgt+1 −
σi,t
α1
(2.6)
where δ is the one-period discount factor for the bank and gt is the market growth rate of
loans in period t.
The first term in equation 2.6 captures what has been labeled the “investment” effect on
price-cost margins. When switching costs exist the bank charges a lower interest rates than
indicated by pure oligopoly power (−σi,tα1 ) as a way to “invest” and capture borrowers that
will be “locked-in” in the future. Notice that −δ ∗σi,t+1 nn−1sgt+1 < 0 so that pcmi < −σi,tα1 .
Therefore, the market share σi,t+1 will be larger than it would be without this “investment”.
The second term in equation 2.6 captures the “harvesting” effect on price-cost margins. After
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the “investment” in period t, in period t+ 1 bank i harvests per-unit profits of −σi,tα1 5.
2.2.2 Empirical Strategy
Two estimation equations are obtained from the KKV model. From the demand-side,
an equation for the transition probability of bank i’s market share (equation 2.3). From the
supply-side, the pricing equation for loans (equation 2.6).
In order to make the estimation possible, we first-difference equation 2.3 to eliminate the
bank specific intercept αi0. This yields a two-equation system with two unknowns given by:
∆σi,t+1 = −∆σi,t n
n− 1sα1 + α1(∆pi,t+1 −∆p¯−i,t+1) + ζit+1 (2.7)
and
pcmi,t = −δ ∗ σi,t+1 n
n− 1sgt+1 −
σi,t
α1
+ ωit (2.8)
where ∆ denotes first-order difference. For the demand transition probabilities, ζit+1 is
assumed to be unobservable shocks to demand and assumed to be exogenous to bank specific
cost shifters (zc):
E[ζit+1(s, α1)|∆zc] = 0.
We follow Dick (2007) to use the first differences of a bundle of costs shifters as instruments
of the lending rate. These include wage rates, deposits rates, federal funds rates, expenses
on premises and fixed assets, cash to assets ratio, real estate loans to assets ratio, loans to
individuals to assets ratio and credit risk measurements 6.
In the supply side equation, ωit is assumed to be an unobservable shock to price-cost margins
and assumed to be exogenous to bank specific demand shifters (zd) after controlling for bank
and time fixed effects:7
E[ωit(s, α1)|∆zd] = 0.
5Recall that α1 < 0, so that the second term in equation 2.6 is positive.
6Dick (2007) uses a nested logit model to estimate a demand system in the local market for deposits in
the U.S.
7To avoid dealing with an over-parametrization problem, instead of introducing bank and time dummy
variables, we bank and time demean the variables to control for these fixed effects.
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We use the lead market shares in deposits and the pool of employees, and multiple number
of lags of market shares in loans, deposits and the pool of employees 8.
We then form the vector of sample moment conditions as a function of parameters which is
given by:
g(s, α1) =
1
n
∑
it
ωit+1(s, α1)∆zd
ζit+1(s, α1)∆z
c

where n is the total number of observations in the sample. The GMM estimators are:
(sˆ, αˆ1)GMM = arg min
s,α1
g(s, α1)
′Wg(s, α1)
where W is a weighting matrix.
We use the rolling method to estimate the switching costs for each period and to form a
time series of estimates S = (S1, S2, ..., ST ). In the rolling estimation, the switching costs
at period t (St) are estimated using the data six years before period t. This is because we
need one lead to estimate the switching costs. With this method, St can also be interpreted
as the average switching costs in six years before t.
Following KKV, we assume the maturity of loan contracts to be at most three years. Notice
that an increase in the length of maturity will dramatically reduce the number of observations
that can be used for estimation, since both one lead and one lag of the variables used as
instruments are needed. We estimated S assuming shorter maturities (1 or 2 years) as
a robustness test, and found that the estimates tend to decline as the assumed maturity
length increases. This is consistent with KKV, who find that borrowers hardly switch when
estimating the model with one- and two-year lags.
Data
We collect the banking data from the Consolidated Reports on Condition and Income
(CALL Reports). These are bank-level balance sheet and income statement data available
8The point estimates of the switching costs vary with the number of lags used for the instruments.
However, their pattern over time is the same regardless of the number of lags used.
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from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago for all banks regulated by the Federal Reserve
System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the Currency.
We work with quarterly data from 1985 to 2009. In the Appendix B.1.1 we provide more
details on the treatment of these data. In total our data includes 638,392 bank-quarter ob-
servations or on average 8,305 banks per quarter. We consider our data as a comprehensive
sample of banking industry in the U.S. since it covers more than 97% of commercial banks.
Because lending rates are not reported in bank statements, we need to impute them from
information on interest income and loans. We use interest income on loans divided by total
loans to approximate loan rates at the bank-level. Similarly, we approximate deposit rates
at the bank-level as the ratio of interest expenses on deposits to total deposits. Finally, we
calculate price-cost margins as the difference between loan and deposit rates.
We use Treasury bill rates to construct banks discount factors, assuming that they accu-
rately reflect the opportunity cost of funds for banks.
Last, all variables are measured in 2000 constant U.S. dollars, and deflated using the con-
sumer price index (CPI).
2.2.3 Empirical Results
The estimated switching costs are shown in Figure F.1. The estimates are significant at
the 5% level, which indicates the existence of significant switching costs in the U.S. banking
system9. The thick solid line shows the point estimates of the switching costs, and the
dashed line is the lower boundary of 10% confidence interval.
It is evident from this figure that switching costs decreased from around 30% in 1994 to
around 4% to 5% in 2001 and 2002 and increased back to around 16% to 20% at the end of
2006. In this sense, it is worth noting that our structural estimates do not measure the bor-
rowers “direct pecuniary” costs of switching banks only. Consistent with the model in Kim,
Kliger and Vale (2003), they capture the “economic costs associated with the capitalized
value of long-term customer bank relationships”. Therefore, the observed structural break
94 out of 51 estimated switching costs are significant at 10% level and the other 47 are at least at 5%
level.
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in the pattern followed by switching costs may have resulted from the important deregula-
tion efforts that took place at the end of the last decade, particularly those related to the
elimination of interstate branching restrictions. As banks’ geographical coverage expanded,
borrowers should have started to find it easier to switch lenders10.
2.3 The Bank Lending Channel
In this section we apply the identification strategy in Arena, Reinhart and Vazquez
(2006) to study the impact of switching costs on the bank lending channel of monetary
transmission. Specifically, we use the specification of equation (2.9) below, and estimate it
using standard OLS.
With this specification, we seek to estimate the first derivative ∂Lsit/∂Mt, and the cross-
derivative ∂2Lsit/∂Mt∂St, where L
s
it is the loan supply of bank i at time t, and Mt and St are
measures of the stance of monetary policy and of switching costs at time t. A negative sign
for the first derivative provides evidence in support of the bank lending channel. The sign
for the cross-derivative shows whether switching costs for borrowers strengthen or weaken
this channel.
∆ log(Lit) = α0 + α1T + α2T
2 +
4∑
j=1
βj∆ log(Lit−j) +
4∑
j=1
γj∆ log(GDPt−j)
+
4∑
j=1
δj∆Mt−j +
4∑
j=1
θjSt−j +
4∑
j=1
φjSt−j∆Mt−j
+ ρ1c1i,t−1 + ρ2c2i,t−1 + ρ3c3i,t−1
+ control dummies+ εit.
(2.9)
In this equation i indexes each individual bank, and t denotes time. Equation (2.9) relates
the volume of loans (L) to an indicator of the stance of monetary policy (M) and a measure
of switching costs in banking (S). The switching costs measure is the estimate for each pe-
riod obtained in Section 2.2 and presented in Figure F.1. To model the effects of switching
10Studying in depth the causes of this change in the pattern followed by switching costs is beyond the
scope of this paper. We leave this for future work.
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costs on the bank lending channel of monetary policy we interact the switching costs S with
the monetary policy indicator M at various lags.
To capture possible time effects, we include both linear (T ) and quadratic (T 2) time trend
terms as dictated by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Last, εi,t are the unobservable
bank-level, time-varying shocks.
Notice that following Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Ashcraft (2006) we have added the
lagged dependent variable among the regressors.
Market size varies substantially over time in our sample. Therefore, to avoid a given change
in the stance of monetary policy to have a larger impact on the volume of loans in larger
markets, we use the percentage change in loans as the dependent variable instead of the
volume of loans itself.
We follow Adams and Amel (2005) and Ashcraft (2006) and assume that monetary policy
shifts banks’ marginal costs by affecting the interest rates they must pay for loanable funds.
Therefore, for the measure of the stance of monetary policy (M), we use the first difference
of short-term interest rates. Following previous empirical work on monetary policy in the
U.S., we use the Federal Funds rate as an indicator of the stance of monetary policy.
We include the growth rate of GDP to control for changes in loan demand, and to isolate
the effect of switching costs on the supply-side of the market for bank loans. The idea is
that in this way the coefficients measure the effect of the various regressors on the sup-
ply of loans Lsit, so that we can identify both the first and the cross derivatives discussed
above. Thus, this helps us identify the supply−side bank lending channel from the alterna-
tive demand−side interest rate channel. We use several lags of GDP growth to avoid the
potential endogeneity bias arising from GDP being influenced by the supply of credit.
Furthermore, using bank-level data allows us to apply the identification strategy of previous
studies based on the widely agreed notion that banks facing different financial constraints
adjust their supply of credit differently to monetary shocks 11. Thus, the idea is to test for
cross-sectional differences in the response of bank lending to monetary shocks across het-
11See Peltzman (1969), Kashyap and Stein (1995 and 2000), Cecchetti (1999), Favero et al (1999), Kishan
and Opiela (2000) and Ashcraft (2006), among others.
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erogeneous banks facing different financial constraints12. Since financial constraints cannot
be directly measured, here we follow the standard practice in the literature of using two
specific bank characteristics, liquidity and capitalization, to proxy for these heterogeneities
in financial constraints. The degree of liquidity (c1) is computed as the ratio of cash to total
assets. The degree of capitalization (c2) is computed as the ratio of equity capital to total
assets. The assumption is that more liquid and better capitalized banks tend to pay a lower
risk premium for non-insured debt, and are therefore, better prepared to isolate their loans
from unexpected monetary policy-induced shocks to deposits. We also include a measure of
bank size (c3), which can capture other elements unrelated to banks’ financial constraints.
The argument is that bigger banks might find it easier to issue market instruments, which
would make them better prepared to face negative monetary shocks. Following Arena et al
(2007) and to eliminate possible trends in the measure of size, we use a relative measure,
calculated as the difference between the logarithm of total assets of a bank in a given period,
and the average of the logarithm of assets across all banks in that period:
c3i,t = log(assetsi,t)−
∑nt
i=1 log(assetsi,t)
nt
(2.10)
where nt represents the number of banks at time t
13.
There are three endogeneity concerns associated with these bank-level controls. First, bank
size may be endogenous to loan growth. Second, it is not clear that better capitalized banks
are less financially constrained, i.e. a bank may choose to raise more equity only because it
faces a higher external finance premium at first. Third, bank liquidity can also be a biased
measure of financial constraints if banks optimally choose to have a more liquid asset struc-
ture just to compensate for higher financing restrictions. Therefore, to reduce potential bias
to the regression coefficients associated to these endogeneities, we follow Arena et al (2007)
and use the lagged values of these bank-level characteristics in equation (2.9).
Following Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (forthcoming), we introduce dummy variables to control
12Also, having these controls for bank-level characteristics should result in more efficient estimates of the
coefficients of interest on the monetary policy indicator and the interaction term.
13We also use the absolute measure of bank size (log(asseti,t)) as a control instead of the relative measure
for robustness check. The results are very similar and available from authors upon request.
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for two important regulatory changes that took place in the United States banking sector
during the period covered by this study. First, in 1994 the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking
Act allowed national banks to operate branches across states after June 1, 1997. Second, the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act enacted in November of 1999 increased the number of activities
allowed for banks. We also control for seasonal effects in the quarterly data by introduc-
ing quarterly dummies, and for potential geographic heterogeneities by introducing Federal
Reserve-district dummy variables14.
We also convert all variables which involve interaction terms into deviation scores, which
lets the coefficients of the linear terms be interpreted as the overall effects when the inter-
acted variable is evaluated at its sample mean15. Also, when estimating equation (2.9) we
compute heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors.
Last, to show that the inclusion of our generated switching costs is based on the valid as-
sumption that the bank lending channel is at work, we estimate equation (2.9) with and
without including S and S ∗∆M respectively. The comparison of the results for these two
specifications is useful to test whether the inclusion of switching costs changes the results
for the standard model of the bank lending channel.
The coefficients of interest are
∑4
j=1 δj and
∑4
j=1 φj .
∑4
j=1 δj measures the overall effect
of monetary policy on the loan supply schedule when switching costs are held at their mean.∑4
j=1 φj measures its marginal effect when switching costs deviate from its mean. We
expect an increase in interest rates to reduce the growth of bank lending, so that the value
of
∑4
j=1 δj should be negative, providing evidence in support of the existence of the bank
lending channel. Also, based on our discussion in the introduction, the presence of borrowers
switching costs should strengthen the bank lending channel. Thus,
∑4
j=1 φj should also be
negative.
14Following Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Cetorelli and Goldberg (2009), we also tried introducing state
dummy variables, but the results do not change significantly.
15See Aiken and West (1991) for a detailed discussion of centering data in the presence of interaction
terms.
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2.3.1 Data
Data on macroeconomic variables including CPI, GDP, Treasury bill rates and the Fed-
eral Funds rate are from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Bank-level data are from the Call Reports as presented in section 2.2.2, and summarized in
the data Appendix B.1.2.
2.3.2 Empirical Results
Table E.8 shows the results of our benchmark bank lending channel regression16. At first
we ignore the impact of switching costs on the bank lending channel, by estimating equation
(2.9) without including the switching costs variables. The first column of Table E.8 shows
the results of this exercise. Having controlled for demand effects, the δ coefficients capture
the supply-side effects of monetary policy on the market for credit. Thus, these negative
values support the idea that the bank lending channel is at work in the United States, and
the validity of the specification of equation (2.9). The coefficients on real GDP growth are
positive, and they indicate an increase in demand for bank credit when real GDP is growing.
The results of equation (2.9) are reported in the second column of Table E.8. The inclusion
of the switching costs has no qualitative effects on the control variables, and monetary policy
tightenings keep having a negative effect on loan growth, which indicates the validity of the
inclusion of the switching costs measure. The coefficient on the interaction term S ∗ ∆M
has the expected negative sign. This supports our conjecture in the introduction that the
real effects of monetary policy are increasing in the magnitude of switching costs. When
borrowers cannot costlessly switch lenders after a monetary tightening, the excess demand
for credit left by small, financially constrained banks cannot be “picked up” by larger, less
constrained banks. Therefore, the aggregate supply of loans shrinks by more, and the real
effects of policy are stronger the larger these switching costs.
Table E.9 shows the percentage change in bank lending as a result of a one percentage point
increase in the stance of monetary policy, for several levels of the switching costs. Since we
16Although they are not reported here, the coefficients on the time, seasonal and Federal Reserve-district
dummy variables are highly significant.
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use deviation scores of S and ∆M , the coefficient of ∆M itself is the percentage change in
lending after a one percentage point increase in the Federal Funds rate when switching costs
are evaluated at their mean. The coefficient suggests that one percentage point increase in
the Federal Funds rate will decrease bank lending by around 2.20%, which is higher than
the results for the standard bank lending channel shown in the first column of Table E.8
(i.e. 1.06%). Also evident from Table E.9 is that monetary policy becomes more effective
as switching costs rise. For example, in economies where S is at the 25th percentile of its
distribution, a one percentage point increase in the stance of monetary policy induces a
1.03% reduction in the supply of loans. In economies where borrowers find it more costly
to switch lenders, i.e. in economies where S is at the 75th percentile of its distribution, a
monetary policy tightening of the same magnitude induces the supply of credit to fall by
3.21%, a reduction almost three times larger.
Furthermore, the coefficient on switching costs themselves is negative, suggesting that the
supply of credit tends to grow at a lower rate as these costs rise.
Regarding the effects on the supply of credit of the strength of banks balance sheets, esti-
mation results indicate that increased liquidity in the previous period consistently lead to
faster current loan growth. They also show that more capitalized banks exhibit smaller loan
growth. Last, bank size does not seem to exert a significant direct effect on loan growth in
the U.S. in the period covered by this study.
On the Effects of Banks Financial Constraints
It is widely accepted that banks facing different degrees of financial constraints adjust
their supply of credit differently in response to monetary shocks. Bank size, liquidity and
capitalization are often used in the literature to proxy for these financial constraints.
Banks of different size respond differently to monetary shocks mainly for two reasons. First,
small banks often have simpler capital structures and finance their loans mostly through
transaction and savings deposits. When the money supply shrinks, these banks are not able
to maintain their loan supply by resorting to cash or securities. Second, smaller banks have
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larger costs of dealing with the informational asymmetries involved in raising uninsured
funds to finance their lending (see Peltzman (1969)). It is also known that less capitalized
banks find it more difficult to obtain funding through capital markets to protect their loan
portfolios (see Kashyap and Stein (1995 and 2000), Favero et al (1999) and Kishan and
Opiela (2000) among others).
Exploiting our bank-level data, we are able to study this feature of the bank lending channel
of monetary policy. Following Ashcraft (2006), we now add additional terms to the regressors
in equation (2.9) by interacting the lagged bank-level characteristics c1, c2 and c3 with the
monetary policy indicators. Therefore, the equation we estimate is:
∆ log(Lit) = α0 + α1T + α2T
2 +
4∑
j=1
βj∆ log(Lit−j) +
4∑
j=1
γj∆ log(GDPt−j)
+
4∑
j=1
δj∆Mt−j +
4∑
j=1
θjSt−j +
4∑
j=1
φjSt−j∆Mt−j
+
4∑
j=1
ψ1j∆Mt−jc1i,t−1 +
4∑
j=1
ψ2j∆Mt−jc2i,t−1 +
4∑
j=1
ψ3j∆Mt−jc3i,t−1
+ ρ1c1i,t−1 + ρ2c2i,t−1 + ρ3c3i,t−1
+ control dummies+ εit.
(2.11)
We do this with two goals in mind. First, to examine whether the estimated switching costs
are only another proxy for these financial constraints of the banking system. If this was the
case, then the inclusion of these three interaction terms is likely to wash out the effect of
S ∗ ∆M , and make the coefficients ∑4j=1 φj insignificant. Second, these additional terms
help to better identify the supply−side bank lending channel, by testing the prediction that
banks heterogeneous in their degree of financial constraints will react differently to monetary
policy (i.e. the coefficients φ1, φ2 and φ3 are expected to be positive).
These results are presented in Table E.10. All coefficients of ∆M and S keep their signifi-
cant negative signs. Since the effects of the switching costs on lending are not “picked up”
by these three proxies, this indicates that switching costs are not only a proxy for financial
constraints in the banking industry. Therefore, from this exercise we can conclude that
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switching costs have an effect on the transmission of monetary policy that is independent
from the effect of financial constraints in the banking sector itself, as measured by banks’
sizes, and the degree of liquidity and capitalization of their balance sheets.
We also test for cross-sectional differences across heterogeneous banks in the impact of
switching costs on the transmission of monetary policy. With this goal, we perform three
exercises, partitioning our sample into sub-samples according to the degree of financial con-
straints faced by banks, as measured by their size (Tables E.11 and E.12), liquidity (Tables
E.13 and E.14) and capitalization (Tables E.15 and E.16), respectively.
The results of each sub-sample are similar to those for the entire sample. Results are robust
across these size, liquidity and capitalization categories, in the sense that within each group
the bank lending channel is still at work, and monetary policy always becomes more effective
as switching costs rise for borrowers.
Table E.12 shows the percentage change in lending by size categories given one percent-
age point increase in the Federal Funds rate. For all three sub-samples, the bank lending
channel is strengthened with higher switching costs. When the switching costs are at their
mean level, banks above 75th percentile by size will decrease lending by about 0.3 percentage
point less than banks below 75th percentile by size. This differential increases to about 0.4
percentage points when the switching costs increase to the 75th percentile. Summarizing,
this table shows that the supply of loans is more sensitive to monetary shocks among small
banks than among larger institutions, which is consistent with previous results by Kashyap
and Stein (1995) and Kishan and Opiela (2000).
Regarding the response of the supply of loans to monetary shocks for banks with different
degrees of liquidity, Table E.14 shows that when the switching costs are above the 50th per-
centile level, the more liquid banks (> 25th percentile) respond to monetary policy slightly
less than less liquid banks (<= 25th percentile). Although the effect of the monetary policy
on the lending is not monotonic over three sub-samples, to some extent these results also
mirror the results of previous work that more liquid banks are less financially constrained,
and therefore respond less to monetary policy. Thus, the results in Tables E.11, E.12, E.13
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and E.14 support the existence of supply-side effects in credit markets.
Tables E.15 and E.16 show the results for banks of different degrees of capitalization in their
balance sheets. Again, results are robust, and all coefficients of interests are significantly
negative. However, the effect of the Federal Funds rate on lending does not show the pat-
tern we expect, i.e. that more capitalized banks respond less to monetary shocks. We will
investigate this issue further in future work.
To further study the supply-side effects of monetary policy on credit markets and their rela-
tionship with switching costs, we follow Ashcraft (2006) and include one last set of additional
controls in equation (2.9). These are the interaction terms between the c characteristics and
the demand indicator ∆GDP , aimed at testing whether the presence of switching costs
changes the response to demand shocks of heterogeneous banks. The equation we estimate
now is:
∆ log(Lit) = α0 + α1T + α2T
2 +
4∑
j=1
βj∆ log(Lit−j) +
4∑
j=1
γj∆ log(GDPt−j)
+
4∑
j=1
δj∆Mt−j +
4∑
j=1
θjSt−j +
4∑
j=1
φjSt−j∆Mt−j
+
4∑
j=1
ψ1j∆GDPt−jc1i,t−1 +
4∑
j=1
ψ2j∆GDPt−jc2i,t−1 +
4∑
j=1
ψ3j∆GDPt−jc3i,t−1
+ ρ1c1i,t−1 + ρ2c2i,t−1 + ρ3c3i,t−1
+ control dummies+ εit.
(2.12)
The results are reported in Table E.17. All coefficients of ∆M and S are still significantly
negative, which again supports the isolation of the effect of the switching costs on the lending
channel. Also, the effect captured by these interaction terms is insignificant, which indicates
that there is no evidence of systematic differences in the response to changes in loan demand
across heterogeneous banks. These results offer even more evidence supporting the existence
of supply-side effects in the market for bank loans in the U.S..
Last, we include the interactions of bank-level characteristics with both the monetary policy
and the demand indicators. This larger set of controls allows us to further isolate the effect
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of switching costs on the transmission of monetary policy. The results are reported in Table
E.18. The fact that after the inclusion of these controls switching costs still have a significant
effect on lending and that they still reinforce monetary transmission provides more evidence
that these costs do indeed impact the environment in which monetary policy decisions are
made, and their transmission to the real side of the economy.
2.4 Conclusions
In this paper we study the relationship between switching costs for bank-dependent
borrowers and the effectiveness of monetary policy through the bank lending channel. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first effort in the literature to explicitly examine the
effects of switching costs on the bank lending channel. We proceed in two steps. In the
first we apply the structural I.O. model of Kim, Kliger and Vale (2003) to estimate the
switching costs for borrowers of large commercial banks in the U.S.. We find that switching
costs have followed a downward trend from around 30% in 1994 to around 4% to 5% in 2001
and 2002 and increased back to around 16% to 20% at the end of 2006. In the second step
we assess how these costs affect the environment in which monetary policy is conducted,
and its transmission to the rest of the economy through the bank lending channel. We find
that these costs have an important impact on the effectiveness of monetary policy, and that
this effect is independent from that of financial constraints of the banking industry itself.
Specifically, the higher switching costs, the larger the impact that monetary policy shocks
have on the real sector of the economy. Our results have policy implications particularly
relevant at a time when monetary policy is being heavily used as a stabilisation device
around the world, while the financial crisis is leading to significant market structure changes
in banking, which in turn can impact the magnitude of the borrowers switching costs that
we study in this paper. An interesting area for further research is to extend this work to a
sample of developed and emerging economies, to be able to make a cross-country comparison
of both the magnitude of switching costs and their role on the transmission of the monetary
policy. Doing so would also allow us to uncover some interesting patterns regarding the
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macroeconomic and financial determinants of switching costs. We leave this for future work.
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3. Product Differentiation and Inefficiencies in the Retail Banking Industry
3.1 Introduction
Economic theory predicts markets can sometimes deliver inefficient products.1 In a ho-
mogenous product market, free entry can lead to too many products than socially optimal.
When an entrant causes incumbent firms to reduce output (business-stealing externality),
the private benefit to the marginal entrant may be greater than its social benefit. Free entry
results in a wasteful duplication of fixed entry cost, which outweighs the welfare gain from
lower price.2 In a differentiated product market, the marginal entrant offers another positive
externality by increasing product varieties. The product variety externality works against
business-stealing. Their trade-offs, together with the toughness of price competition, deter-
mine the efficient products in the market. Empirical evidences from Berry and Waldfogel
(1999) find over-entry and substantial welfare loss in the homogenous product markets. But
only a limited number of studies look at differentiated product markets.
In this paper, we assess the welfare implication of entry in the retail banking industry. Since
the Riegle-Neal Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, banks have been actively
extending their retail branches. In most areas, traditional local banks now face competition
from branches of large banks operating in multiple locations across wide geographic areas.
While the new players in the local market may benefit consumers by offering diversified
choices at attractive prices, the social benefit of liberalizing entry is ambiguous. According
to bancography’s survey, the land and construction cost for opening a new branch approaches
2 million in 2003. 3 There is no guarantee that the benefits of the entrant exceed its cost.
Thus, retail banking provides an ideal setting to investigate the welfare implications of en-
1E.g., Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Mankiw and Whinston (1986).
2Consider an extreme case where two firms are perfect substitutes for each other and the price is fixed.
The entry of the second firm halves the share of the incumbent without providing any additional benefit to
consumer but the fixed entry cost is duplicated. However, if the entrant lowers the price, welfare loss from
the business-stealing can be offset.
3Source: http://www.bancography.com/downloads/Bancology0803.pdf. In our sample, an average bank
has 1.8 branches, suggesting a 3.6 million cost just for land and construction. The fixed entry cost can be
much higher.
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try and competition. In particular, we are interested in understanding the role of product
differentiation in delivering efficient products.
One significant feature of our model is to endogenize the bank’s product type choice. We es-
timate a discrete consumer choice model, focusing on the distinction between single-market
banks (S) and multi-market banks (M). Using the demand estimates, we derive the prof-
itability of operating in the market for each type by assuming banks set the deposit interest
rates to maximize profits. Finally, we recover the fixed entry cost from the operating rev-
enue and the observed market configurations, knowing that banks will enter and choose
the product type that delivers positive profits and the competition is more intensive among
similar banks. Using the estimates, we construct the social planner’s objective and evaluate
the socially optimal product type by choosing among alternative products.
Our paper extends the seminal work of Berry and Waldfogel (1999) who find excessive entry
in homogenous product markets. While several other papers (e.g., Maruyama (forthcom-
ing), Dutta (2006)) extend Berry and Waldfogel (1999) to differentiated product markets,
our paper contributes to the literature by incorporating an equilibrium model predicting the
product type each firm has chosen. In the spirit of Mazzeo (2002), banks enter the market
if their profits are high enough to cover fixed costs. Meanwhile, banks select the profit-
maximizing product type, knowing that margins fall at different rates depending on the
relative location of its competitors in the product space. The key feature of the model is to
allow the degree of competition to vary across different market segments. However, Mazzeo
(2002) adopts a reduced-form profit specification. Departing from Mazzeo’s approach, we
use the estimates from a structural demand model to infer bank profits. This allows us to
perform welfare analysis and quantify both consumer surplus and firm profits. Along similar
lines, the work by Seim and Waldfogel (2009) investigating the Pennsylvania liquor market
is also close to our paper. While they focus on transportation cost and the physical location
of the firm, we look at firms’ quality choices in the product space.
Our model emphasizes the distinctions between single- and multi-market banks, which are
important to both consumers and local communities. In the literature of banking industry,
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Adams et al. (2007) and Dick (2008) are among the first to estimate bank demand that
explicitly allows product differentiation, in particular, focusing on the differences between
single-market and multi-market banks. The novel work of Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) inves-
tigates the entry and product type decisions of deposit institutions including single-market
banks, multi-market banks and thrift institutions. Their model infers the degree of compe-
tition from a reduced-form profit specification. Though our produce type choice is similar
to Cohen and Mazzeo (2007), our analysis incorporates consumer choices into the model.
It allows evaluation of the change in consumer surplus and bank profits under alternative
regimes.
Our results confirm the existence of welfare loss under free entry. We find that entering
into the wrong location (in the product space) is the major source of welfare loss. The total
surplus in approximately 13%-15% sample markets can be improved. In 2000, the total
surplus can increase by 2.94 million when moving to optimal configurations, while in 2008,
the gain is 3.52 million. Product differentiation significantly improves the total surplus. In
a counterfactual when differentiation is not allowed, bank profits drop by 50% on average
while the consumer surplus drops by 20-38%.
This paper proceeds as follows: section 3.2 presents background information on various
aspects of the industry; section 3.3 sets up the model and illustrates estimation details; sec-
tion 3.4 describes the data and discusses the unit of observation; section 3.5 presents results;
section 3.6 concludes with a discussion of the implications of the results.
3.2 Background
Our research is motivated by the substantial changes in retail banking in the past a
few decades. In the 1970s, many individual states required banks to have a single branch
and interstate banking was prohibited. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act of 1994 permitted nationwide branching. Since then, some banks have actively
expanded their retail branches in new locations either through de nova entry or consolidation.
Large banks with branches across wide geographic areas begin to emerge. In the meantime,
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thousands of much smaller banks operate in individual local markets throughout the country.
What are the economic benefits of market structure change? How are the benefits divided
between consumers and banks? What is the cost? Our model aims to address these questions
in a general setting. Our analysis focuses on two types of commercial banks: single-market
and multi-market banks. Recent papers about the deposit institutions have also looked
at the interactions between thrift and commercial banks. For example, both Adams et al.
(2007) and Ho and Ishii (2009) estimate the substitutability between the deposit institutions
in the 90’s. They find the deposit market is highly segmented and the substitution between
banks and thrifts is limited.4 Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) support the demand side finding by
looking at the entry decision of banks and thrift institutions between 2000 and 2003. Their
results suggest the presence of thrift institutions reduces the bank’s profit by a very small
amount compared to bank competitors.5 Earlier papers such as Amel and Starr-McCluer
(2001) find that thrifts, savings banks and credit unions comprise less than 6 percent in
terms of U.S. deposits as of 1999. Amel and Hannan (1999) estimate a residual deposit
supply and find that nonbank financial institutions should not be included as participants
in antitrust bank merger analysis. Based on the empirical evidence of the literature, we
choose to focus on commercial banks in the subsequent analysis.6
3.3 The Model
3.3.1 Demand and Bank Profit
In the model, each consumer chooses either a single bank for depository services or no
depository services from any bank. Consumer i in a local market m chooses to open an
4For example, Adam et al. (2007) find the median of the bank-thrifts price elasticity to be -0.1 and
thrift-bank elasticity is -0.079 in most rural counties in 1990-2001. Though these numbers are statistically
significant, they are economically small. The bank-bank price elasticities are much larger. Ho and Ishii
(2009) find insignificant thrift effect in consumer valuation for deposit institutions.
5For example, Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) find that in 2000, the first thrift competitor reduces the mul-
timarket bank margin by only 0.03 points and the effect is insignificant. By contrast, the effect of the first
single-market competitor is -0.54 and is strongly significant. Similarly, the effect of the first thrift competitor
to single market bank is -7.E-06 and insignificant while the effect of multi-market competitor to single-market
bank is -0.56 and highly significant.
6Based on prior findings in the literature, we do not believe our results will change measurably when
thrifts are included. Our model can easily incorporate thrift institutions but it computationally complicates
the entry estimation.
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account at any of the banks j = 1...Jm or opts for an outside alternative j = 0 to maximize
her utility uijm:
uijm = α(yi + pjm) + xjmβ + ξjm +
∑
g
djgζjg + (1− σ)εijm
= δjm +
∑
g
djgζjg + (1− σ)εijm, j = 1...Jm, g = {S,M}
ui0m = α(yi) + (1− σ)εijm.
(3.1)
The outside option includes an account at a thrift institution, credit union, brokerage, or
no account at all. We normalize the utility from choosing the outside option to be zero.
Consumer i’s income yi enters the utility function linearly so α can be interpreted as the
marginal utility of income. pjm is the deposit interest rate offered by bank j in market
m and xjm is a set of bank characteristics measuring the quality of service. xjm include
branch density, which proxies how easy the consumer can access the bank services, number of
employees, which proxies the waiting time. Based on the empirical evidence in the literature,
we focus on two types of banks: single-market bank (S) and multi-market bank (M), i.e.
g ∈ {S,M}. djg is a bank type indicator and it equals one if j is a type g bank. ξjm is
the unobserved product characteristics. εijm is an idiosyncratic utility shock for bank j in
market m.
The bank type indicator djg allows consumer preferences to be correlated within similar
product categories. Follow the discrete choice literature, we assume ξjg + (1 − σ)εijm are
i.i.d extreme value distributed. The consumer utility maximization generates the nested
logit demand. Following Berry (1994), let sj|g be the share of bank j among type g banks,
the demand can be simplified to:
ln(sjm)− ln(s0m) = δjm + σ ln(sj|g). (3.2)
The coefficient σ measures the degree of substitutability among similar type of banks. When
σ approaches zero, the model converges to a logit demand model. The greater σ is, the
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greater the substitution is among products in the same group g.7 As σ approaches one, the
consumer substitutes to products only in the same group.
There are several reasons to choose the nested logit specification. First, the consumer values
the product type (single- and multi-market bank) through sj|g and therefore is more likely
to substitute to banks of similar type. Secondly, the nested logit generates more realistic
substitution patterns than logit and yet is simple to estimate. Our demand model is similar
to Dick (2008) who looks at a different time period. We stick to this relatively simple demand
specification to make the product type choice model more tractable. Our empirical results
suggest the price elasticities implied by our model are close to what have been found in
the literature using alternative demand models such as GEV. The demand side parameters
are identified through moment condition E(ξjm|Zjm) = 0 by interacting ξjm with demand
instrument Zjm. We will introduce instruments in the later sections.
Our demand model implies the price elasticities take the following form:
εjj = − αpj
1− σ (1− σsj|g − (1− σ)sj)
εjk = αpk(
σ
1− σsk|g + sk) for j 6= k and j, k ∈ g
εjk = αskpk for j 6= k and j, k 6∈ g
g ∈ {S,M}.
(3.3)
Based on the elasticities, we back out the profitability of operating in the deposit market by
assuming banks choose the deposit rate to maximize profit. The objective for bank j is to
set pjm to maximize:
pijm = (ljm − pjm −mcjm)SjmM − Fjm. (3.4)
ljm represents the loan rate, mcjm is the marginal cost of operating in the market. Denote
rdjm = ljm −mcjm, so that rdjm represents the marginal return to each deposit account.
We model rdjm as a function of bank characteristics. The FOC of bank profit maximization
7To see this point, refer to the cross-price elasticities (3.3).
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implies:
rdjm = pjm + Sjm(
dSjm
dpjm
)−1 = wjmθj + ζjm. (3.5)
To simplify the bank’s objective, we assume the bank’s profitability of operating in the
market is proportional to the market share in deposits. The return to deposit rate is assumed
to be determined in other product markets and we infer the margin (return to deposit rdjm)
from deposit market competition. We also recognize banks could have made many other
strategic decisions aside from the deposit interest rate. In this paper, we focus on deposit
market decisions because they are significant for both banks and consumers. The major
role of the bank is to attract deposits and channel them into other financial products. The
banks’ investment and lending decisions are capacity constrained by their deposits. Ideally,
we would like to model deposit and lending decisions at the same time. However, this
is difficult since they belong to different product markets and the nature of demand and
supply differs substantially. We summarize other activities of banks into one variable rdjm.
One may also consider the implied return to deposit rate rdjm as a lower bound for bank
profitability.
3.3.2 Entry
Assuming firm j will enter the market if and only if entry results in positive profit,
the bank’s market presence reveals the operating profit, which helps us back out the fixed
entry cost. However, without additional refinement, this assumption can result in multiple
equilibrium market structures. We adopt the insight from Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) and
further assume that similar types of banks compete more aggressively with each other.8
Formally, this assumption implies that:
piS(NS − 1, NM ) > piS(NS , NM − 1)
piM (NS , NM − 1) > piM (NS − 1, NM ).
(3.6)
8This assumption is also supported by our demand estimates. We find a positive and significant group
coefficient σ, suggesting substitution is indeed more likely among banks of similar type, all else equal.
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The vector (NS , NM ) represents the number of single and multi-market banks. The exact
functional form of pi is based on demand estimates and (3.4). It is an implicit function of
market configurations (NS , NM ). This is a reasonable assumption for retail banking. The
literature (e.g., Cohen and Mazzeo (2007), Dick (2008)) has shown that banks choose to
enter different locations in the product space to avoid head-to-head competition and the
differentiation between multi- and single-market banks generates substantial returns.
Consider firms in each market to be playing a two-stage game. In the initial “investment”
stage, firms decide whether to enter and choose to offer services as a multi-market or single-
market bank. Once firms have made their entry and product-type decisions, firms choose
deposit interest rates, compete with each other, and payoffs are realized. We consider a
Stackelberg game in which firms play sequentially and make irrevocable decisions about
entry and product type before next firm plays. Firms do anticipate that subsequent firms
will have the opportunity to make decisions about entry and product type once they have
committed to their choice. The last firm of each product type finds entry profitable and
prefers the chosen product type to the alternatives. Additional entry, in either product
type, is not profitable. Therefore, a Nash equilibrium can be represented by an ordered pair
(NS , NM ) when the following inequalities hold:
M (NS , NM − 1) > 0, piM (NS , NM ) < 0
piS(NS − 1, NM ) > 0, piS(NS , NM ) < 0
piM (NS , NM − 1) > piS(NS , NM − 1)
piS(NS − 1, NM ) > piM (NS − 1, NM ).
(3.7)
Mazzeo (2002) proves that under assumption (3.6), above equilibrium conditions (3.7) will
result in a unique equilibrium market configuration (NS , NM ). We further assume the entry
cost Fjm takes the following form:
Fjm = υmφj + εjm. (3.8)
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The type-specific entry cost is a function of market demographics upsilonm (e.g., population
and income), where φj are parameters to be estimated. εjm is a bank market specific shock
that prevents the model from perfect prediction. As is common in a discrete choice model,
we cannot identify φj without distributional assumption of εjm. We assume (εMm, εSm)
are joint normal and i.i.d across markets. Given the equilibrium conditions (3.7) and our
parameter (θj , β), the probability of observing (NS , NM ) in each market can be specified
using the distribution of ε. We choose parameters φj to maximize the likelihood (3.9) that
our entry model predicts the same market configuration (NS , NM ) as the data.
9
LH =
∏
m
Prob(NS , NM )
O
m. (3.9)
3.3.3 Social Welfare
Following Small and Rosen (1981), in the context of the discrete choice model, welfare
effects of changes in the choice set between periods s and s−1 in a given market are measured
as the expected equivalent variation (EV) of the changes. EV is defined as the amount of
money that would make consumers indifferent in expectation, between facing the two choice
sets, let U t = E[maxj=1..Jt U
t
ij ], and α to be marginal utility of income, McFadden (1981)
shows:
EV =
1
α
E(U t − U t−1). (3.10)
For a nested logit demand, let Dg =
∑
j∈g e
δj/(1−σ), the total consumer surplus is:
CS =
1− σ
α
ln(
∑
g
Dg + 1). (3.11)
Since we assume banks are symmetric within a type, so that Dg = Nge
δj/(1−σ). δg is
evaluated using weighted characteristics of type g bank. Let Ng denote the number of type
9We derive the analytical form of the likelihood function. See Appendix C for implementation details.
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g bank, sj|g = 1/Ng. The total consumer surplus is:
CS =
1− σ
α
ln
 ∑
g∈{S,M}
Nge
δj/(1−σ) + 1
 . (3.12)
The planner’s objective is to maximize the sum of consumer surplus (3.10)and bank’s profit
(3.4) by choosing among alternative market configuration (NS , NM ), subject to the constrain
that banks participate in the market, i.e.:
maxNS ,NM
 1−σ
α ln(
∑
g∈{S,M}
Nge
δj/(1−σ) + 1) +
∑
g∈{S,M}
Ngpig

s.t. : pig ≥ 0.
(3.13)
In the planner’s problem, both dg and pg are implicit functions of (NS , NM ) and model
parameters. Solving the planner’s problem analytically is difficult, because the optimal con-
figuration (N∗S , N
∗
M ) is jointly determined by two FOCs of (3.13) which are highly non-linear
in (NS , NM ). We use grid search to solve for the optimal market configuration numerically.
3.4 Data
Our data is a panel from 2000 to 2008. We use the panel to recover demand parameters
and then perform the entry analysis for 2000 and 2008 respectively. We draw the data from
several different sources. Bank characteristics (e.g., asset, bank age, number of employees,
wages, interest expenses) come from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Coun-
cil’s Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports).10 The data on branch location and
branch deposit, used to construct market shares and branch density, are obtained from the
Summary of Deposit issued by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).11 The
market demographics are taken from both the U.S. Census and the Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
The deposit interest rate is computed as a six-month bank level interest rate from the Call
10The Call Report is a census of all the banks insured by FDIC. It is issued on a quarterly basis.
11The Summary of Deposit is an annual report.
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Report. We divide the interest paid on deposits in March and June by the total deposits in
June.12 We do recognize the deposit interest rate is imputed instead of directly observed,
despite this is a common practice in the literature. For a large number of banks (37%
of the sample) operating on only one or a few geographical markets, this definition works
fine. Without additional information, the observations for banks spanning a large number
of markets will contain some measurement error. Nevertheless, Adams et al. (2007) show
the institution-level interest reflects the actual pricing behavior of the industry.
Following the literature (Adams et al. (2007), Dick (2008)), we define market share to be
the number of accounts held by each bank in the market divided by the market size.13 The
number of accounts held by each bank is available only at bank level, which is not a problem
for single-market banks. The number of market level accounts for multi-market banks is
calculated by distributing the total number of bank-level accounts to each market according
to the share of its deposit obtained in the market. We define the market size to be popula-
tion multiplied by a scaling factor. According to Adams et al. (2007), an average person in
a household owns 2.5-3 accounts. The total market size is therefore defined by population
times a scaling factor of 3. For markets where the total number of accounts exceeds market
size, we use a scaling factor of 1.01 times the total number of accounts.14
We assume symmetry among single-market and among multi-market banks. Though we can
easily allow a heterogeneous bank in our demand estimation, modeling the identity of each
bank significantly complicates the entry estimation. Like other studies, we take the weighted
average of characteristics for each type of bank in the market and assume symmetry within
types.15
Consistent with empirical evidence from the banking literature (e.g., Amel and Starr-
McCluer (2001), Petersen and Rajan (2002)), we delineate the geographic markets using
12Our definition is similar to Ho and Ishii (2009). Adam et al. (2007) and Dick (2008) use an annual
interest rate. The Call Report is issued quarterly. We find more missing values are present when we try to
construct the annual deposit income. We decide to use a six-month interest rate instead.
13An alternative definition of market share is deposit share. However, this definition is very sensitive to
income effect. Ishii (2004) has a discussion of the details.
14Our definition of market size and market share is similar to Adam et al. (2007). Dick (2008) uses
alternative methods to impute the number of accounts in each market. Our demand estimates are robust to
alternative market size/share definition and scaling factor.
15We use market share to weight the characteristics for each bank.
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rural counties. Following Cohen and Mazzeo (2008), we focus on rural markets and elim-
inate all urban areas such as Metropolitan Statistical Areas. This is because we are more
confident that no distinct or overlapping submarkets exist within the rural areas. We ex-
clude banks with deposits less than 1,000 dollars, or with less than 100 deposit accounts, or
with average account balance less than 200 dollars in a market.16 We consider a commercial
bank to be a single-market bank if more than 80% of its deposits are obtained from one
market and to be a multi-market bank otherwise.17 We drop the market if no single-market
or no multi-market bank is present in the market 18 or if the market has more than eight
banks in either type.19 Finally, we drop one market with no banks elder than one year, one
market where banks earn abnormal profits,20 two markets without personal income data,
and two markets where the total number of deposit accounts multiplied by personal income
is greater than 15 billion.
The summary statistics of key variables over the whole sample are presented in the upper
panel of Table E.21. Our sample consists of 20,482 bank/market/year observations from
2000 to 2008. The average deposit interest rate is about 1.89%. For welfare analysis, the
summary statistics of key variables in 2000 and 2008 are presented separately in Table E.26.
Our sample consists of 2,480 bank/market observations in 1,240 rural counties in 2000 and
2,044 bank/market observations in 1,022 rural counties in 2008. The average deposit interest
rate drops from 2.75% to 1.93% from 2000 to 2008 while the average share remains mostly
unchanged. The change in the deposit interest rate may partially come from changes in
service quality. Most of the quality measures (e.g., branch density, bank size) increase over
the sample periods. We expect the banks with higher service quality offer lower deposit
interest rates. However, we do not expect the change in qualities can fully explain the sharp
16Adam et al. (2007) use a similar approach.
17This definition is similar to Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) who use 80%. Ho and Ishii (2009) uses 90%. Our
results are robust when we change the threshold from 80 to 90 percent.
18We drop counties with zero banks in either type since instruments are missing in these markets. One set
of instruments includes characteristics of banks in the other type. Dick (2008) performs similar exercises.
19We drop markets with more than 8 banks of either type for computational reason. When including these
markets, the entry estimation takes significantly longer to converge. Under the above criterion, 33 markets
in 2000 and 54 markets in 2008 are dropped. To check the robustness, we winsorize the data at eight and
re-estimate the model. The results remain the same.
20Banks earn more than 10 times average profits in the market.
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changes in deposit interest rates.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Estimates
We estimate demand for deposit services (3.2) as a function of the deposit interest rate
and bank characteristics. Table E.22 displays the results.21 The unobserved product quali-
ties, ξjm, which are valued by consumers and unknown to econometrician, will bias both α
and σ in the estimation. When ξjm is high, the bank providing better services (e.g., more
extensive ATM network, short waiting time at the counter) will offer a lower deposit interest
rate. This biases the price coefficient α downwardly. On the other hand, high xijm implies
high demand for product j, which attracts entrants at j’s location g in the product space
and subsequently lower within group share sj|g. This biases downwardly.
To address endogeneity, we use three sets of instruments. The first set includes market
demographics such as population and income. They reflect the profit and cost of operating
in the market. They are correlated with group shares through a firm’s entry and position
decision and are otherwise assumed to be uncorrelated with the consumer’s valuation for the
unobserved bank quality.22 However, banks in the same market face exactly the same market
conditions, despite their type g. Therefore, this set of instruments only helps in identifying
group parameter but not the price coefficient alpha. The second set of instruments is the
competitor’s characteristics in different type X−g. The identification assumption is that the
competitor’s location in the product space affects j’s pricing decision and is assumed to be
uncorrelated with j’s unobserved quality.23 The third set of instruments is bank-level cost
shifters. The rationale is that banks with lower cost are capable of offering a better deposit
interest rate and the cost of operating is assumed to be uncorrelated with local demand. We
include variables such as bank wage rate, expenses on premises and equipment, credit cost,
21First stage is reported in Appendix E.31
22Adams et al. (2007) use market demographics as instruments in estimating demand for deposit institu-
tions. Berry and Waldfogel (1999) use similar instruments in estimating demand for radio stations.
23Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) are among the first to use competitor’s product characteristics as
instruments for price. Dick (2008) uses similar instruments in estimating the nested logit demand for deposit
institutions.
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and other expenditures. The summary statistics of instruments can be found in Appendix
E.30. Both market and year fixed effects are included in all specifications to account for the
market level heterogeneities and demand/cost shocks common to all banks in a given year.
The stark differences between OLS and IV specification highlight the importance of correct-
ing the endogeneity. The magnitude of α and σ is more than tripled in the IV specification.
The price coefficient is positive and highly significant, implying the bank attracts more
customers by offering a higher deposit rate. The group parameter σ is highly significant,
suggesting that consumers are indeed more likely to substitute to similar banks. 24 The rest
of the estimates are significant with expected signs. The branch density is highly significant
and its effect tapers off. Consumers prefer banks with greater branch density so that each
branch offers better services by focusing on fewer customers. Similarly, consumers prefer
a bank with more employees per branch since the waiting time tends to be shorter and
consumers potentially receive more assistance. The size and age of a bank are also valued
by consumers as they tend to be considered as reliable.25
To gauge the magnitude of our estimates, we calculate the own- and cross-interest rate elas-
ticities in Table E.23. The median interest rate elasticity is 1.83 in 2000, i.e. a 1% decrease
in deposit rate will result in a 1.83% decrease in market share. The single-market bank
faces less elastic demand than a multi-market bank (the median interest rate elasticity is
1.69 vs. 1.92). The cross-bank interest rate elasticities suggest substitutions are more likely
among similar banks (-0.47 vs. -0.09). When a multi-market bank raises its interest rate
by 1%, the market share of another multi-market bank will decrease by 0.47%, while the
share of another single-market bank decreases by only 0.09%. The magnitude of interest
rate elasticities is consistent with existing empirical evidence. For example, Dick (2008)
finds the median price elasticities among banks in the urban market to be 1.77 between
1993 and 1999. Adams et al. (2007) find the median elasticities among all banks in ru-
ral counties to be 2.54 in 1990-2001. Like previous papers, our results suggest the deposit
market is highly segmented: own elasticities are big relative to cross-price elasticities and
24This cross-validates our nested logit specification and the assumption in entry estimation.
25The signs of the coefficients are similar to what have been found by Dick (2008) and Adams et al. (2007).
However, the magnitudes of the coefficients are not directly comparable since our sample is different.
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the substitution is more likely among similar banks. One most important implication from
our demand estimates comes from cross-interest rate elasticities: the substitution is more
likely among similar banks, therefore competition is more intensive among similar banks.
This helps justify the key assumption in our product type choice model: the entry of an
additional S bank reduces the margin of another S bank more than that of another M bank
and vice versa.
Using our demand estimates, we derive the marginal return to deposits by exploring the
first order condition (3.5). As shown in Table E.23, the average return rate to each deposit
account is 4.34% in 2000 and drops to 3.47% in 2008. While both deposit interest rate and
return decrease in 2008 compared to 2000, the average markup is higher in 2008. We use
the inferred markup to construct the post-entry profit for banks, which is used to recover
entry parameters φj . One key assumption of our equilibrium entry model is that the com-
petition is more intensive among similar banks, as defined by (3.6), which depends only on
demand parameters. Though our demand estimates confirm that substitutions are indeed
more likely among similar banks, all else equal. There is no guarantee that (3.6) holds in
every market.26 For welfare comparison between 2000 and 2008, we focus on the same 600
rural counties in both years and perform entry analysis on the subsample.
We estimate the equilibrium product type model (3.7) using maximum likelihood. The
results are displayed in Table E.24. All estimates have expected signs.27 The entry cost in-
creases with population, which suggests limited scale economy. In more populated markets,
the inputs such as land property rent are usually more expensive. The effect of population is
less pronounced among multi-market banks as they often operate on a larger scale. Similarly,
the entry cost increases with income and decreases with the number of farms. The decrease is
sharper for single-market banks (-0.94 vs. -0.64 in 2000). This is consistent with Cohen and
Mazzeo (2007) who find single-market banks have a comparative advantage serving agricul-
tural areas. The size of entry cost is approximately 82% of six-month operating revenue for a
26They hold in more than 2/3 of markets (e.g., 1,033 out of 1,240 markets in 2000 and 768 out of 1,022
markets in 2008).
27We also experiment with different sets of market level cost shifters and include additional variables such
as population density, establishments and payroll etc. We believe our current specification best matches the
data.
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single-market bank and 85% for a multi-market bank in 2000. While banks may make their
entry decisions based on long-run payoffs, our entry model estimates the entry cost from
the current six-month payoffs. This is a reasonable simplification under a certain stationary
assumption and is widely adopted in static entry models. Consistent with our static entry,
the fixed cost is quite stable between 2000 and 2008 (82% vs. 81% for single-market banks,
and 85% vs. 88% for multi-market banks). As a robustness check, we re-estimate our entry
model by employing the reduced-form profit as in Cohen and Mazzeo (2007). We use the
estimates to compute correlation between our structural and reduced-form profits. We find a
strong positive correlation between our structural profit and Cohen-Mazzeo’s reduced-form
profit. We believe our model captures important features in the bank deposit market. The
details can be found in the Appendix D-F.16.
3.5.2 Welfare Analysis
We predict the welfare changes over 2000 and 2008 using our demand and entry estimates.
28 The distribution of the surplus is displayed in Table E.25. In 2000, the average six-month
consumer surplus is 1.19 million which accounts for the majority of 1.33 million in total
surplus. Compared to 2000, the average consumer surplus drops by about 0.1 million in
2008, while the producer surplus remains mostly unchanged.
The biggest change in consumer surplus comes from the drop in deposit interest rate. To
understand the sources of consumer surplus change, we further decompose it into four sets of
variables. They capture the contribution of changes in market conditions that are common
to all banks, in product mix, in bank qualities and in deposit interest rates. We allow each
set of variables to adjust in turn holding other variables at their 2000 levels. As a baseline, we
compute the consumer surplus (3.11) in 2000. The change in CS caused by common shocks
is captured by including the 2008 year fixed effect in calculating the surplus. As shown in
Figure F.2, the average surplus in our sample increased by 0.24 million from 1.19 to 1.43
million. To obtain the change in surplus coming from product mix, we further adjust the
market configuration to the 2008 level, while holding other variables (bank characteristics
28The welfare comparison is based on a sub-sample of 600 markets in 2000 and 2008.
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and deposit interest rates) at the 2000 level. The average contribution of product mix
is approximately -0.04 million.29 Between 2000 and 2008, the average number of multi-
market banks increases while the number of single-market banks drops slightly and the total
number of banks remains almost unchanged. Our model suggests that the consumer surplus
(3.11) is increasing in both NM and Ns, however, the marginal contribution of an average
single-market bank is greater than an average multi-market bank. Consequently, we expect
a negative net welfare change due to the decreases in the number of single-market bank.
Thirdly, the contribution of change in bank quality is evaluated by further adjusting bank
characteristics to the 2008 level. The average gain from change in bank characteristics is
0.24 million dollars. We expect a positive effect since most characteristics improve over the
sampling period.30 Finally, the contribution of deposit interest rate is evaluated by adjusting
interest rate to the 2008 level. It causes the consumer surplus to decrease by 0.39 million to
1.09 million. As shown in Table E.26, the mean deposit interest rate in the sample markets
drops from 2.75% to 1.93%. While other bank characteristics also change over the sample
period (e.g., the branch density increases from 1.21 to 1.33), the drop in deposit interest
rate offsets the benefits. The cut in deposit interest rate is substantial, especially in 2008 in
response to a negative macroeconomic shock. As shown in Figure F.5, the federal funds rate
decreases sharply from about 5.45% in the first month of 2000 to a 40-year low of 0.16% in
the last month of 2008. The drop in the federal funds rate lowers the costs of inter-bank
borrowing and therefore reduces the bank’s willingness to pay for deposit.
The net consumer surplus change roughly equals -$1.74 per population/year between 2000
and 2008. The literature focuses primarily in the 1990s and finds substantial gains in
consumer surplus. Dick (2008) estimates a consumer in the median market experiences a
gain in welfare of $8-18 per year from market changes between 1993 and 1999. Ho and Ishii
(2009) estimate a $19 per consumer per year gain between 1994 and 2000. The magnitude
of loss found by our paper is significant but not substantial compared to the gain from
1990s. Our estimates also suggest small producer surplus relative to consumer surplus and
29Note that to separate the product mix effect from price effect, we keep the deposit rate at the 2000 level
in this step.
30Except for the number of employees per branch. It decreases slightly from 16.32 to 15.31.
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the fixed entry cost accounts for a large portion of operating revenue. As discussed before,
the bank’s deposit profit implied by our model can understate the overall bank profitability
and therefore should be considered as a lower bound. We do not expect much welfare loss
under free entry since the fixed cost is small relative to consumer surplus.
3.5.3 Policy Simulations
The total welfare under optimal configuration is obtained by evaluating the planner’s
problem (3.13). For each market, we take 300 draws from the distribution of (εS , εM ) that
are consistent with the observed market configuration.31 This ensures the observed market
configuration is a subset of model prediction in each market.32 For each simulated draw,
we find the optimal configuration that solves (3.13) by performing a grid search.33 We set
up our grid so that a market accommodates at most 15 banks in each type.34 Specifically,
we evaluate the total surplus for all possible configurations between (0, 0) and (15, 15) and
pick the configuration generating the highest surplus. In each market, there are 162 market
configurations to be evaluated for each simulated draw and evaluating each configuration
requires numerically solving for the equilibrium price (PS , PM ) implied by the first order
condition (3.5). The aggregated welfare loss is displayed in Table E.27 and the distribution
of total surplus is displayed in Figure F.4.
Compared to the optimal, the major welfare loss comes from mis-configuration (i.e. a
firm enters the wrong position in the product space). We define mis-configuration to be
the situation where (Sobs > Sopt,Mobs < Mopt) or (Sobs < Sopt,Mobs > Mopt).35 We
find mis-configuration in approximately 13%-15% of markets between 2000 and 2008. The
intuition why mis-configuration might occur comes from the discrepancies between planner’s
problem (3.13) and the objectives (3.7) that govern a firm’s entry decisions. In the planner’s
31This involves taking draws from truncated-bivariate normal distribution and is quite computationally
challenging.
32Berry and Waldfogel (1999) use a similar approach.
33Grid search is appropriate since the configurations (the number of banks in each type) are integers.
34In our data, each market can have at most 8 banks in each type.
35Very few markets (5 in 2000 and 2 in 2008) incur over-entry and the magnitude of loss is negligible. We
define over-entry to be the situation where the observed bank in each type is at least as many as optimal
(i.e SobsSopt,MobsMopt and (Sobs,Mobs) 6= (Sopt,Mopt)).
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problem (3.13), the welfare maximization is subject to two constraints which guarantee each
entrant earns positive profit. By contrast, under free entry, banks also choose the profit
maximization type on top of positive profit condition. Though profit maximization is partly
incorporated in the planner’s objective function, there is a tradeoff between CS and PS.36 In
certain markets, the contribution of a marginal bank to consumer surplus as one particular
type may be quite large but the bank will simply choose the more profitable type. Thus if
the marginal bank switches to a different type, the bank’s profit will decrease but the total
surplus will increase. The markets that experience mis-configuration are generally slightly
bigger than average.37 In general, the marginal bank finds it more profitable to operate
as M type while the contribution to surplus is greater as S type. Table E.27 compares the
surplus to the optimality. In 2000, the possible six-month gain in total surplus can be as
much as 2.94 million under optimal configuration and it rises to 3.52 million in 2008. As
indicated in Table E.27, a shift of surplus from bank to consumers helps improve the overall
social welfare.
To understand the mechanics of welfare improvement under optimal configuration, we focus
on two effects improving the consumer surplus: the product mix effect and price effect. The
comparisons are displayed in Figure F.3. For each year, we compute the consumer surplus
implied by the observed configuration (CS1) and use it as a baseline. To evaluate the change
in consumer surplus due to changes in product mix, we compute the consumer surplus (CS2)
by adjusting the configurations to the optimal level while holding deposit rate fixed at the
observed level. The average consumer surplus increases by 0.1 million in 2000 and 0.09 in
2008. We compute the total surplus (CS3) by further adjusting the deposit interest rates
accordingly. The average contributions of price effect (CS3-CS2) are 0.04 million in both
years. While both price and product mix effects are quite substantial, change in product
mix effect contributes more.
Finally, we demonstrate the welfare gain of product differentiation with a counterfactual
36Our demand system suggests the equilibrium prices and firm’s profit are highly non-linear in the number
of competitors in the market. No analytical solutions can be found. Figuring out the exact pattern of the
tradeoff between CS and PS is beyond the scope of this paper.
37The characteristics of these markets are displayed in Appendix E.33.
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experiment. Though the social welfare can be improved if firms enter the correct location
in the product space, the product differentiation in general greatly improves the social
welfare. We simulate the counterfactual scenario where only multi-market banks or only
single-market banks are allowed to operate in the market. The results are displayed in
Table E.28. Without product differentiation, the number of the banks that can be sustained
in the market decreases dramatically. In the 48 markets with two banks (i.e. the total
number of bank is 96), only 74 single-market banks can survive if multi-market banks are
not allowed, while only 81 multi-market banks can survive when single-market banks are not
present. Both consumers and banks benefit from differentiation. In 2000, the aggregated
consumer surplus is 716.6 while it drops by almost 30% to 512.7 when only single-market
banks operate and to 522.5 if only multi-market banks are allowed. The banks benefit even
greater from softened price competition. Without product differentiation, the aggregated
bank profits drop from 43.5 to 22.7 if only single-market banks are allowed and to 17.7
if only multi-market banks are allowed. Similar changes can be found if we predict using
2008 data. The magnitude is slightly greater. The results in Table E.28 partially address
the benefit of the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994. In particular, we address the benefits to both
consumers and banks.
3.6 Conclusions
In this paper, we evaluate the welfare effect of free entry in the retail banking market.
We use an explicit model of vertical differentiation to address the nature of competition of
this industry. While the literature of retail banking generally focuses on pre-2000 deposit
market, our paper looks at a more recent period from 2000-2008 and finds a loss in consumer
surplus. This may partially offset the welfare gain from Riegle-Neal Act of 1994. Our results
also confirm the welfare loss under free entry. In particular, we identify entering into the
wrong location in the product space to be the major source of inefficiency. Nevertheless,
product differentiation is beneficial to both consumers and banks. In a counterfactual ex-
periment when differentiation is not allowed, both consumer surplus and bank profit drop
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dramatically. Throughout our analysis, we take steps to understand the sources of welfare
change. They can be helpful to policymakers in analyzing other questions such as mergers.
Our model is clearly not perfect. For example, we did not explore the horizontal feature
in bank’s branch network but instead, we control for branch density; we make symmetry
assumptions in order to keep our model computationally tractable and bank heterogeneity
can potentially play important roles. While we stress the significance of vertical differentia-
tion in this paper, it would be interesting to pursue other important dimensions of banking
in future works.
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Appendix A. Data Explanation for Chapter 1
A.1 Bankscope Data Cleaning Rules
Bankscope has considerably improved its data coverage beginning in 1996. But this cov-
erage after 2004 is still small for many countries, partially due to a lagged data processing
issue. Thus, the sample covers the nine years from 1996 to 2004.
First, I exclude observations that have negative or missing values for the needed variables.
Second, because the estimation of switching costs requires data with a high time-dimension
and the Bankscope data are unbalanced, I select for banks which report more than one
statement the statement in which the needed variables have the most non-missing values. If
more than one statement has the same number of qualified observations, I keep the unconsol-
idated statement. This statement selection rule provides the most non-missing observations
for the estimation.
Since the lending rates are not reported in bank statements, they have to be imputed from
the information on bank interest income and earning assets. Moreover, because the infor-
mation on interest income from loans is not available for either many countries or many
years, I need to use bank total interest income. I construct the bank-level lending rates by
dividing bank interest income over bank total earning assets. The industrial average lending
rates computed based on this construction is close to the IFS country-level lending rates.
I use the differentials between interest income and interest expenses divided by bank total
earning assets to measure the price-cost margin of loans.
I drop observations with lending rates or deposit rates greater than 400%. This is an ar-
bitrary rule to delete obvious outliers. Some banks may experience mergers so that their
total assets increase considerably over time. Including these observations will underesti-
mate switching costs. But excluding these observations will overestimate switching costs as
mentioned by Kim, Kliger and Vale (2003). Considering that the KKV model implies the
lower-boundary estimate of switching costs, I decide to keep those banks which experienced
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merger events in order to be consistent with the lower boundary implication.
During the years our sample covers, no currency redenomination occurred in any coun-
try. However, some countries experienced exchange rate system reforms during the sample
years. These reforms will artificially change the size of the lending markets of highly dol-
larized economies. For example, Argentina’s switching to floating exchange rates in 2002
resulted in a significant devaluation of peso. Therefore, the size of its lending market ar-
tificially grew considerably because the economy has been well dollarized since 1999. One
plausible way to deal with this inconsistency problem is to convert the data in the country’s
own currency to the U.S. dollars by using market exchange rates. This treatment, however,
also has problems because it will artificially change market size as well. Taking the case
of Argentina again, if we convert all data from peso to dollars by using market exchange
rates, the value of peso assets will artificially drop as the peso is devalued while the value
of dollar assets remains consistent. Hence, without information on shares of dollar assets in
the banking industry, this treatment cannot correct the devaluation problem in dollarized
economies. Meanwhile, we can see from the two equations that need to be estimated, all
variables are unit free except the market growth rates. So only the growth rates during the
year when the devaluation happens will be affected by the devaluation problem. Considering
that no better way to correct this problem exists and that the magnitude of its impact on
variables is not significant, I keep all data in original currencies. For European countries,
Bankscope uses consistent currency for the EURO area so that the data for EU countries
are consistent over time.
I use average Treasury bill rates over the sample years to construct the discount factor
for each country since they approximately reflect the opportunity costs of bank loans. For
countries where Treasury bill rates are not available, I approximate the discount factor using
either government bond yield rates or prime lending rates.
Since the price-cost margins, interest rates and market shares are endogenous, instruments
are therefore required. Furthermore, due to data availability I use various lags of market
shares and other earning assets as instruments.
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Since we need one lead and various lags of variables as instruments to estimate the system,
the estimation incurs significant computational costs. An increase in the length of maturity
will dramatically reduce the number of observations that can be used for estimation. At the
same time, no information on the average maturity of bank loans is available. Therefore, I
use one single year as the benchmark of maturities to make comparisons across countries.
A.2 Crisis Dummy Variable Construction
I follow the following strategy in constructing the crisis dummy variable:
Debt crisis dummy variable: I follow Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001), a debt crisis occurs
when either (or both) of the following conditions occur: (1) there are arrears of principal
or interest on external obligations toward commercial creditors (banks or bondholders) of
more than 5% of total commercial debt outstanding; (2) there is a rescheduling or debt
restructuring agreement with commercial creditors as listed in the Global Development
Finance (World Bank Debt Tables). The variable I used for ratio (1) is:
Interest arrears,private creditors+Principal arrears,private creditors
Debt stock,total private nonguaranteed
.
For (2) the debt rescheduling or restructuring is considered to occur when at least one of the
following variables is positive: Principal rescheduled, private; Interest rescheduled, private;
Principal forgiven; Interest forgiven; Debt stock reduction; Debt buyback. Therefore, the
debt crisis dummy is equal to 1 if ratio (1) is more than 5% or (2) debt rescheduling or
restructuring occurs or both, otherwise it is equal to zero.
Currency crisis dummy variable: Following Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), I apply monthly
data to the following functional form to construct the currency market turbulence index:
It =
∆et
et
− σe
σR
∗ ∆Rt
Rt
where I is the turbulence index, ∆e is the change of exchange rate, e is the current exchange
rate, R is the international reserves (minus gold), ∆R is the change of international reserves,
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σe and σR are sample standard deviations of change of exchange rate and that of interna-
tional reserves, respectively. The currency crisis dummy is equal to 1 if I is higher than 3
standard deviations above the sample mean, otherwise it is equal to zero.
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Appendix B. Data Explanation for Chapter 2
B.1 Data Cleaning Rules for Switching Costs Estimation
We estimate switching costs for 1994-2006 period. Before 1994, the switching cost es-
timates are mostly insignificant. We cannot estimate switching costs after 2006 given our
data covers until 2009, since we need three leads of data.
Table E.19 provides the data summary statistics.
B.1.1 Data Cleaning Rules for Switching Costs Estimation
We work only with commercial banks, since the switching costs among borrowers of
commercial banks are likely to be different from those of borrowers facing other financial
institutions. Also, Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) show that financial institutions of different
types compete differently. Since the estimation needs one maturity lead and one maturity
lag, we drop the observations with missing values in either one maturity lead or one maturity
lag or both. We also drop the observation with missing instruments. We drop observations
with deposit rate greater than 20%. Finally, we drop one observation which has loan rate
greater than 50% and one observation which has net interest margin less than 10%. We
assume the maturity to be three years. Finally, we end up with 638,392 bank-quarter
observations or 8,305 banks per quarter left in the sample for the estimation of switching
costs. We consider our data as a comprehensive sample of banking industry in the U.S.
since it covers more than 97% of commercial banks. The descriptive statistics are reported
in sample I of Table E.19. Several facts are worth noting: The number of commercial banks
per period ranges from 5,957 to 10,699, it reflects the fact that many banks existed from the
industry through mergers and acquisitions in the last decade. The maximum market shares
of a bank among the large bank group is about 14%, which indicates the presence of some
mega-banks in our sample. The average loan rate in our sample is 5.73%, which is lower
than the prime lending rate reported by the Fed. This is because the imputed lending rate
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is risk-adjusted. The minimum net interest margin is negative, which reflects banks practice
of setting price below marginal costs to “lock-in” new customers.
B.1.2 Data Clean for Bank Lending Channel Estimation
To eliminate potential outliers, in this step we drop observations with loan growth rates
being outside of the mean plus/minus five standard deviations range.
We also drop from the sample those banks that are likely to have been involved in a merger
and/or an acquisition, defined as those for which the RIAD4356 variable in the Call Reports
(which measures changes due to business combinations) is not equal to zero.
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Appendix C. Implementation Notes for Entry Model
The post-entry profit function for type T ∈ (S,M) bank is:
piT = ΠT (S,M) + εT (C.1)
Lets assume εT follow standard bivariate normal distribution: εM
εS
 ∼ f
 0
0
,
 1 ρ
ρ 1


C.1 S > 0, M > 0
The assumptions that an additional entrant always decreases profits and that the decrease
is larger among similar firms imply the following:
piS(S − 1,M) > piS(S,M − 1)
piM (S,M − 1) > piM (S − 1,M)
(C.2)
piS(S − 1,M) > piS(S,M)
piS(S,M − 1) > piS(S,M)
piM (S − 1,M) > piM (S,M)
piM (S,M − 1) > piM (S,M)
(C.3)
If we assume the entry is a Stackelberg game. In such a game, banks sequentially make
irrevocable decisions on entry before the next bank plays. Banks anticipate that subsequent
banks will make decisions on entry and product type once the earlier movers have committed
to their choice. A Nash equilibrium can be represented by the following inequalities:
piM (S,M − 1) > 0, piM (S,M) < 0 (C.4)
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piS(S − 1,M) > 0, piS(S,M) < 0 (C.5)
piM (S,M − 1) > piS(S,M − 1) (C.6)
piS(S − 1,M) > piM (S − 1,M) (C.7)
We can solve for the inequalities (C.4)-(C.7) for the stochastic parts:
ΠM (S,M − 1) < εM < −ΠM (S,M)
−ΠS(S − 1,M) < εS < −ΠS(S,M)
(C.8)
εM > ΠS(S,M − 1)−ΠM (S,M − 1) + εS
εM < ΠS(S − 1,M)−ΠM (S − 1,M) + εS
(C.9)
For the simplicity of denotation, lets denote ΠM (S,M −1) = A,ΠM (S,M) = B,ΠS(S−
1,M) = C,ΠS(S,M) = D,ΠS(S,M −1) = E,ΠM (S−1,M) = F . Inequalities (C.2), (C.3),
(C.8) and (C.9) can be written as
A < εM < −B
−C < εS < −D
εM > E −A+ εS
εM < C − F + εS
C > E
A > F
A > B
C > D
F > B
E > D
(C.10)
To solve for the region of (εS , εM ) where inequalities (C.10) hold, we draw the six lines which
express εM = −A, εM = −B, εS = −C, εS = −D, εM = E − A+ εS and εM = C − F + εS ,
as shown in Figure F.6.
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First of all, (C.2) suggests E−A < C−F and this guarantees the existence of the equilibrium.
For εM , E − C < 0 so −A > E − C −A. Similarly, E −D > 0 so −A < E −D −A. Since
line εM = −A is between E − A − C and E − A − D, then lower boundary for εM is
max(−A,E −A+ εS).
For the upper boundary, since F > B then −B > −F , then the upper boundary of εM is
min(−B,C − F + εS).
For εS , since A > F then −A < −F , line εM = −A is between −F and E −A− C. So the
lower boundary of εS = −C.
The upper boundary, however, depends on −B. When −B > E − A − D, the upper
boundary is −D, as in Figure F.6. But when −B < E − A−D, For any εS > A− E − B,
no εM satisfies E − A − εS < εM < −B, as in Figure F.7. So the upper boundary of εS is
min(−D,A− E −B).
In summary, the region in which pairs (εS , εM ) satisfy inequalities (C.10) is:
(−A,E −A+ εs) < εM < min(−B,C − F + εs)− C < εS < min(−D,A− E −B)
The probability of market configuration (S,M)o is then:
Pr(S,M)o =
∫ min(−D,A−E−B)
−C
∫ min(−B,C−F+u1)
max(−A,E−A+u1)
f(u2, u1) du2du1 (C.11)
We the likelihood function:
L =
∑
m
log(Pr(S,M)Om.
Note that (C.11) cannot be directly implemented in Matlab. We further break down the
region of integration into the subsequent cases. There are five cases when S > 0 and M > 0.
(The key is the location of −A and −B.)
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C.1.1 S > 0,M > 0,−B > C − F −D
This case is illustrated in Figure F.6. When −B > C−F −D > E−A−D,min(−D,A−
E−B) = −D. So the upper and lower boundaries of εS are −C < εS ≤ −D. The upper and
lower boundaries of εM depend on the value of εS : When −C < εS ≤ −E,max(−A,E−A+
εS) = −A and min(−B,C − F + εS) = C − F + εS . When −E < εS < −D,max(−A,E −
A + εS) = E − A + εS and min(−B,C − F + εS) = C − F + εS . Therefore the upper and
lower boundaries of εM are:
εM ∈

(−A,C − F + εS) if − C < εS ≤ −E
(E −A+ εS , C − F + εS) if − E < εS ≤ F − C −B
(E −A+ εS ,−B) if F − C −B < εS < −D
The analytical form of probability function is:
Pr(S,M)o =
∫ −E
−C
∫ C−F+u1
−A
f(u2, u1)du2du1 +
∫ −D
−E
∫ C−F+u1
E−A+u1
f(u2, u1)du2du1
+
∫ −D
F−C−B
∫ −B
E−A+u1
f(u2, u1)du2du1
C.1.2 S > 0,M > 0, E −A−D < −B < C − F −D,−B > C − F − E
This case is illustrated in Figure F.7. When −B > E−A−D, min(−D,A−E−B) = −D.
So the upper and lower boundaries of εS are −C < εS ≤ −D. The upper and lower
boundaries of εM depend on the value of εS : When −B > C−F−D,min(−D,A−E−B) =
−D. When −C < εS ≤ −E,max(−A,E − A + εS) = −A and min(−B,C − F + εS) =
C − F + εS . When −E < εS < F − C − B,max(−A,E − A + εS) = E − A + εS and
min(−B,C−F + εS) = C−F + εS . When F −C−B < εS < −D,max(−A,E−A+ εS) =
E −A+ εS and min(−B,C − F + εS) = −B. The upper and lower boundaries of εM are:
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εM ∈

(−A,C − F + εS) if − C < εS ≤ −E
(E −A+ εS , C − F + εS) if − E < εS ≤ F − C −B
(E −A+ εS ,−B) if F − C −B < εS < −D
The analytical form of probability function is:
Pr(S,M)o =
∫ −E
−C
∫ C−F+u1
−A
f(u2, u1)du2du1 +
∫ F−C−B
−E
∫ C−F+u1
E−A+u1
f(u2, u1)du2du1
+
∫ −D
F−C−B
∫ −B
E−A+u1
f(u2, u1)du2du1
C.1.3 S > 0,M > 0, E −A−D < −B < C − F −D,−B < C − F − E
As illustrated in Figure F.8, when −B > E−A−D,min(−D,A−E−B) = −D. So the
upper and lower boundaries of εS are −C < εS ≤ −D. The upper and lower boundaries of
εM depend on the value of εS : when −C < εS < F −C−B,max(−A,E−A+εS) = −A and
min(−B,C−F+εS) = C−F+εS . When F−C−B < εS < −E,max(−A,E−A+εS) = −A
and min(−B,C−F +εS) = −B. When −E < εS < −D,max(−A,E−A+εS) = E−A+εS
and min(−B,C − F + εS) = −B. Hence, the upper and lower boundaries of εM are:
εM ∈

(−A,C − F + εS) if − C < εS ≤ F − C −B
(−A,−B) if F − C −B < εS ≤ −E
(E −A+ εS ,−B) if − E < εS < −D
The analytical form of probability function is:
Pr(S,M)o =
∫ F−C−B
−C
∫ C−F+u1
−A
f(u2, u1)du2du1 +
∫ −E
F−C−B
∫ −B
−A
f(u2, u1)du2du1
+
∫ −D
−E
∫ −B
E−A+u1
f(u2, u1)du2du1
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C.1.4 S > 0,M > 0,−F < −B < E −A−D,−B > C − F − E
This case is illustrated in Figure F.9. When −B < E − A−D,min(−D,A− E − B) =
A − E − B. So the upper and lower boundaries of εS are −C < εS ≤ A − E − B. When
−C < εS ≤ −E,max(−A,E−A+εS) = −A and min(−B,C−F +εS) = C−F +εS . When
−E < εS < F − C − B,max(−A,E − A + εS) = E − A + εS and min(−B,C − F + εS) =
C − F + εS . When F −C −B < εS < A−E −B,max(−A,E −A+ εS) = E −A+ εS and
min(−B,C − F + εS) = −B. The upper and lower boundaries of εM are:
εM ∈

(−A,C − F + εS) if − C < εS ≤ −E
(E −A+ εS , C − F + εS) if − E < εS ≤ F − C −B
(E −A+ εS ,−B) if F − C −B < εS < A− E −B
The analytical form of probability function is:
Pr(S,M)o =
∫ −E
−C
∫ C−F+u1
−A
f(u2, u1)du2du1 +
∫ F−C−B
−E
∫ C−F+u1
E−A+u1
f(u2, u1)du2du1
+
∫ A−E−B
F−C−B
∫ −B
E−A+u1
f(u2, u1)du2du1
C.1.5 S > 0,M > 0,−F < −B < E −A−D,−B < C − F − E
This case is illustrated in Figure F.10. When −B < E −A−D,min(−D,A−E −B) =
A − E − B. So the upper and lower boundaries of εS are −C < εS < A − E − B. When
−C < εS ≤ F −C−B,max(−A,E−A+εS) = −A and min(−B,C−F +εS) = C−F +εS .
When F −C−B < εS < −E,max(−A,E−A+εS) = −A and min(−B,C−F +εS) = −B.
When −E < εS < A−E−B,max(−A,E−A+εS) = E−A+εS and min(−B,C−F+εS) =
−B. The upper and lower boundaries of εM are:
εM ∈

(−A,C − F + εS) if − C < εS ≤ F − C −B
(−A,−B) if F − C −B < εS ≤ −E
(E −A+ εS ,−B) if − E < εS < A− E −B.
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The analytical form of probability function is:
Pr(S,M)o =
∫ F−C−B
−C
∫ C−F+u1
−A
f(u2, u1)du2du1 +
∫ −E
F−C−B
∫ −B
−A
f(u2, u1)du2du1
+
∫ A−E−B
−E
∫ −B
E−A+u1
f(u2, u1)du2du1.
C.2 S = 0,M > 0
When S = 0,M > 0, we do not have definition of ΠT (S − 1,M) because S − 1 < 0. But
ΠT (S,M) is well defined. Therefore, for markets with configuration (S = 0,M > 0), only
inequalities without involving S − 1 hold:
piM (S,M − 1) > 0 , piM (S,M) < 0
piS(S,M) < 0
piM (S,M − 1) > piS(S,M − 1)
piM (S,M − 1) > piM (S,M)
piS(S,M − 1) > piS(S,M)
which is equivalent to
A < εM < −B
−∞ < εS < −D
E −A+ εS < εM < +∞
A > B
E > D
The probability function becomes
Pr(S,M)o =
∫ min(−D,A−E−B)
−∞
∫ −B
max(−A,E−A+u1)
f(u2, u1)du2du1
=
∫ min(−D,A−E−B)
−∞
∫ −B
max(−A,E−A+u1)
fu2|u1(u2|u1)fu1(u1)du2du1.
(C.12)
When S = 0 and M > 0, the likelihood function has two forms depending on the positions
of -A and -B.
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C.2.1 S = 0,M > 0,−B > E −A−D
This case is illustrated in Figure F.11. When−B > E−A−D,min(−D,A−E−B) = −D.
So the upper and lower boundaries of εS are −∞ < εS < −D. When −∞ < εS <
−E,max(−A,E−A+εS) = −A. When −E < εS < −D,max(−A,E−A+εS) = E−A+εS .
The upper and lower boundaries of εM are:
εM ∈

(−A,−B) if −∞ < εS ≤ −E
(E −A+ εS ,−B) if − E < εS < −D.
The analytical form of probability function is:
Pr(0,M)o =
∫ −E
−∞
∫ −B
−A
f(u2, u1)du2du1 +
∫ −D
−E
∫ −B
E−A+u1
f(u2, u1)du2du1.
C.2.2 S = 0,M > 0,−B < E −A−D
This case is illustrated in Figure F.12. When −B < E −A−D,min(−D,A−E −B) =
A − E − B. So the upper and lower boundaries of εS are −∞ < εS < A − E − B. When
−∞ < εS < −E,max(−A,E−A+εS) = −A. When−E < εS < −D,max(−A,E−A+εS) =
E −A+ εS . The upper and lower boundaries of εM are:
εM ∈

(−A,−B) if −∞ < εS ≤ −E
(E −A+ εS ,−B) if − E < εS < A− E −B.
The analytical form of probability function is:
Pr(0,M)o =
∫ −E
−∞
∫ −B
−A
f(u2, u1)du2du1 +
∫ A−E−B
−E
∫ −B
E−A+u1
f(u2, u1)du2du1.
C.3 S > 0,M = 0
Similarly, all inequalities which involve M − 1 do not have a definition. Only the in-
equalities without M − 1 included hold:
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piM (S,M) < 0
piS(S − 1,M) > 0, piS(S,M) < 0
piS(S − 1,M) > piM (S − 1,M)
piS(S − 1,M) > piS(S,M)
piM (S − 1,M) > piM (S,M)
which are equivalent to
∞ < εM < −B
−C < εS < −D
−∞ < εM < C − F + εS
C > D
F > B.
The probability function becomes
Pr(S,M)o =
∫ −D
−C
∫ min(−B,C−F+u1)
−∞
f(u2, u1)du2du1
=
∫ −D
−C
∫ min(−B,C−F+u1)
−∞
fu2|u1(u2|u1)fu1(u1)du2du1.
(C.13)
When S > 0 and M = 0, the likelihood function has two forms depending on the positions
of −B.
C.3.1 S > 0,M = 0,−B > C − F −D
This case is illustrated in Figure F.13. When −B > C −F −D,min(−B,C −F + εS) =
C − F + εS . the analytical form of probability function (C.13) is:
Pr(S, 0)o =
∫ −D
−C
∫ C−F+u1
−∞
f(u2, u1)du2du1.
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C.3.2 S > 0,M = 0,−B < C − F −D
This case is illustrated in Figure F.14. When −B < C − F −D,min(−B,C − F + εS)
depends on εS : when −C < εS ≤ F − C − B,min(−B,C − F + εS) = C − F + εS . When
F − C −B < εS < −D,min(−B,C − F + εS) = −B. Hence the range of εM is
εM ∈

(−∞, C − F + εS) if − C < εS ≤ F − C −B
(−∞,−B) if F − C −B < εS < −D.
The analytical form of probability function is:
Pr(S, 0)o =
∫ F−C−B
−C
∫ C−F+u1
−∞
f(u2, u1)du2du1 +
∫ −D
F−C−B
∫ −B
−∞
f(u2, u1)du2du1.
C.4 S = 0,M = 0
This case is illustrated in Figure F.15. All inequalities involving either S − 1 or M − 1
do not hold. We only have
piS(S,M) < 0
piM (S,M) < 0
which are equivalent to
εM < −B
εS < −D.
The likelihood function has only one analytical form:
Pr(0, 0)o =
∫ −D
−∞
∫ −B
−∞
f(u2, u1)du2du1.
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Appendix D. Reduced-form Entry Estimation: Cohen and Mazzeo Model
We estimate the bank entry model described by Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) with two
types. We parameterize pig(Ng, N−g) where g ∈ S,M , as a function of market demographics
and competitor’s presence:
pig(Ng, Ng) =Xmβg + ~T (θg;Ng, N−g) + εgm
g =M,S
~TM =θMM1 ∗ presence of the first M competitor+
θMM2 ∗ presence of the second M competitor+
θMM3 ∗ number of additional M competitor+
θMS1 ∗ presence of the first S competitor+
θMS2 ∗ number of additional S competitor
~TS =θSS1 ∗ presence of the first S competitor+
θSS2 ∗ presence of the second S competitor+
θSS3 ∗ number of additional S competitor+
θSM1 ∗ presence of the first M competitor+
θSM2 ∗ number of additional M competitor
The estimates are displayed in the table below and the findings are consistent with Mazzeo
and Cohen (2007). The presence of additional competitor reduces the margin of the incum-
bents, and the presence of similar competitor reduces the profit of the incumbents in the
same type more (e.g. θMM1 > θMS1 and θSS1 > θSM1). Our nested logit demand specifi-
cation captures exactly this feature. When the group coefficient σ > 0, the substitution is
more likely among banks in similar type, all else equal.
We plot the relationship between reduced form profits implied by above model and struc-
tural profits in Figure F.16.
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The correlation coefficients between those profits are 0.41 for S Bank in 2000 and 0.37 in
2008, 0.38 for M Bank in 2000 and 0.36 in 2008.
95
Appendix E. Tables
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Table E.4: Estimated Switching Costs
Note: 1. Switching costs are in percentage of loans. 2. The null hypothesis of the ANOVA
is that the mean of switching costs for borrowers in developed countries equals that in
developing countries. 3. *** denotes 1% significance level. 4. N/A indicates that no
estimates out of all combinations of instruments satisfy the transition probability limitation.
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Table E.5: Benchmark Cross-country Regression: Specifications 1-4
Table E.6: Extended Cross-country Regression: Specifications 5-9
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Table E.7: Extended Cross-country Regression: Specifications 10-14
102
Table E.8: Switching Costs and the Bank Lending Channel: Benchmark Model
A ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ denotes estimate is significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table E.9: Percentage Change in Lending as a Result of a 1% Change in the Federal Funds
Rate Benchmark Model
A ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ denotes estimate is significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table E.10: Switching Costs and the Bank Lending Channel: Robustness Check
105
Table E.11: Switching Costs and the Bank Lending Channel: Subsamples by Bank Size
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Table E.12: Percentage Change in Lending as a Result of a 1% Change in the Federal Funds
Rate By distribution of bank size
107
Table E.13: Switching Costs and the Bank Lending Channel: Subsamples by Bank Liquidity
108
Table E.14: Percentage Change in Lending as a Result of a 1% Change in the Federal Funds
Rate By Bank Liquidity
109
Table E.15: Switching Costs and the Bank Lending Channel: Subsamples by Bank Capital-
ization
110
Table E.16: Percentage Change in Lending as a Result of a 1% Change in the Federal Funds
Rate By Bank Capitalization
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Table E.17: Switching Costs and the Bank Lending Channel: Robustness Check
112
Table E.18: Switching Costs and the Bank Lending Channel: Robustness Check
113
Table E.19: Data Summary Statistics
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Table E.21: Summary Statistics
116
Table E.22: Demand Estimation
117
Table E.23: Deposit Rate Demand Elasticities
118
Table E.24: Entry Cost Estimation
Table E.25: Welfare Distribution with Observed Market Configuration
119
Table E.26: Summary Statistics of Demand Variables: 2000 and 2008
120
Table E.27: Welfare Loss Due to Market Misconfiguration
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Table E.30: Instruments Summary Statistics
124
Table E.31: The First Stage of Demand Estimation
125
Table E.32: Market Configurations of Entry Sample
126
Table E.33: Characteristics of Markets with Misconfiguration
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Table E.34: Summary Statistics for Cohen-Mazzeo Model
128
Table E.35: Market Configurations for Cohen-Mazzeo Model
129
Table E.36: Entry Estimates of Cohen-Mazzeo Model
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Appendix F. Figures and Graphics
131
Estimates are significant at the 5% level based on a one-tail test.
source : Own estimates.
Figure F.1: Borrowers’ Switching Costs in the U.S.
132
Note: Bar 1 represents CS obtained from bank characteristics and deposit rate in 2000;
Bar 2 allows year fixed effect to adjust to 2008 level;
Bar 3 allows market configuration to adjust to 2008 level while keeping bank characteristics
and deposit rate at 2000 level;
Bar 4 allows bank characteristics to adjust to 2008 level;
Bar 5 allows deposit rate to adjust to 2008 level.
Figure F.2: Decomposition of CS Change between 2000 and 2008
133
Note: Bar 1 represents CS under the observed market configuration and deposit rate;
Bar 2 represents CS under the optimal market configuration and observed deposit rate;
Bar 3 represents CS under the optimal market configuration while allowing deposit rate to
adjust accordingly.
Figure F.3: Product Mix v.s. Price Effect
134
Note: Total surplus under the optimal con.guration is computed based on 300 simulated
draws of (εS , εM ) in each market.
Figure F.4: Distribution of Total Surplus
135
Source: Federal Reserve Bank at St. Louis
Note: The Federal Funds Rate explains the sharp drop in deposit interest rate (thus
consumer surplus) between 2000 and 2008. The decrease of federal funds rate lowers
the costs of inter-bank borrowing and therefore causes substantial decreases in bank.s
willingness to pay for deposit.
Figure F.5: Federal Funds Rate
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Figure F.6: Maximum Likelihood Function of Entry Model: Case 1
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Figure F.7: Maximum Likelihood Function of Entry Model: Case 2
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Figure F.8: Maximum Likelihood Function of Entry Model: Case 3
139
Figure F.9: Maximum Likelihood Function of Entry Model: Case 4
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Figure F.10: Maximum Likelihood Function of Entry Model: Case 5
141
Figure F.11: Maximum Likelihood Function of Entry Model: Case 6
142
Figure F.12: Maximum Likelihood Function of Entry Model: Case 7
143
Figure F.13: Maximum Likelihood Function of Entry Model: Case 8
144
Figure F.14: Maximum Likelihood Function of Entry Model: Case 9
145
Figure F.15: Maximum Likelihood Function of Entry Model: Case 10
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Figure F.16: Distribution of Reduced Form Profits and Structural Profits
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